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 1 
Prelude 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s notion of a “wall of separation” between church and state has not 
kept religion out of American politics, and this thesis demonstrates its presence by 
focusing on the abortion issue in presidential politics. The role of religion in politics is 
particularly evident during presidential election campaigns, in which candidates are 
pressed to express their religious faith by both the voters and a controversy driven news 
media. 
The evolving story of the fictional Republican presidential nominee Arnold 
Vinick, played by the actor Alan Alda on the TV-series The West Wing, serves as a 
perfect backdrop for the topics covered in this thesis. As a pro-choice
1
 Republican 
presidential nominee, Vinick is truly a fictional character, since every Republican 
presidential nominee up until 2008 has opposed abortion and been pro-life.
2
 Nonetheless, 
The West Wing’s portrayal of Vinick’s general election campaign alludes to the dynamics 
of the abortion issue in American politics. Following a tough primary campaign against 
the pro-life Reverend Butler, Vinick is posed the following question related to a brewing 
controversy during a news conference: “Senator, are you going to reconsider Reverend 
Butler’s invitation to his church this weekend?” Vinick responded: 
 
I fully respect Reverend Butler’s position. I mean - I appreciate his invitation. And, ah… 
Look, … I respect the Reverend Butler, and I respect his Church too much to use it for 
my own political purposes, and that’s exactly what I’d be doing if I went down there this 
Sunday – cause the truth is it would just be an act of political phoniness. I may be wrong, 
but I - I suspect our churches already have enough political phonies. 
 
I don’t see how we can have the separation of church and state in this government if you 
have to pass a religious test, to get in this government. And I wanna warn everyone in the 
press and all the voters out there: If you demand expressions of religious faith from 
politicians, you are just begging to be lied to. They won’t all lie to you, but a lot of them 
will. And it will be the easiest lie they ever have to tell to get your votes. So every day 
until the end of this campaign, I’ll answer any question anyone has on government, but if 
you, if you have a question on religion – please, go to church (NBC 2005a).
3
 
                                                
1
 Abortion proponents use the term “pro-choice” to describe their positioning on abortion. Pro-choicers thus 
support Roe v. Wade and the continued legality of abortion. 
2
 Abortion opponents use the term “pro-life” to describe their positioning on abortion. Pro-lifers thus 
oppose Roe v. Wade and want to ban abortion. 
3
 Season 6, Episode 20. Timestamp: [41:27-42:45]. 
 2 
Vinick’s response runs in the same vein as a speech on the role of religion in politics 
given by John F. Kennedy as a presidential candidate in 1960. In his speech, Kennedy 
spoke of a nation where a president’s “views on religion” would be “his own private 
affair,” where decisions would be made “without regard to outside religious pressure or 
dictates,” and “where the presidency would not be ‘limited or conditioned by any 
religious oath, ritual, or obligation’” (Domke & Coe 2008:139). 
Like Kennedy’s speech, the striking thing about Vinick’s answer is its idealism – 
building on a view that religion can somehow be kept out of American politics. In a 
country in which approximately 80 percent believe in God (Gallup 2008),
4
 religion will 
always be a factor in its politics, and certain segments of the electorate will pay close 
attention to candidates’ positioning on an issue such as abortion – and especially so 
during presidential campaigns. The pro-choice Republican presidential candidate John 
Anderson experienced this during the 1980 Republican primaries. When faced with 
protests and questions from pro-lifers, the Congressman defended his views, stating:  
 
I can’t use theological interpretations as the basis for public policy. … I wish we had 
more guidance clinics, more alternatives to individual decisions. There are inevitable 
conflicts. But we’ve got to reconcile this in favor of the person who decides, however 
rightly or wrongly, on the basis of free choice (Yuenger 1980).  
 
According to the news report, Anderson’s response was met with “scattered boos. … 
Then, a sudden burst of applause showed that Anderson had won the crowd over” 
(Yuenger 1980). As I will touch upon in Chapter 4 of this thesis, Anderson stuck to his 
pro-choice position throughout the campaign. Vinick, on the other hand, departed from 
the clear cut reasoning laid out in his statement above. During the last months of his 
fictional general election campaign against the Democratic nominee, Texas 
Representative Matthew Santos, social conservative forces within the Republican Party 
pushed his message rightward on abortion. I will return to Vinick’s evolving positioning 
on abortion in the Postlude following the thesis’ concluding chapter.  
                                                
4
 According to a May 2008 Gallup poll, 90% of Republicans, 77% of Democrats, and 78% of Americans 
believe in God. 
 3 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Abortion was legalized in the United States in 1973 following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Roe v. Wade.
5
 Following the ruling, religious conservatives mobilized and 
contributed to the creation of a powerful grass-roots movement which eventually grew in 
size and gained momentum as leaders and organizers from a wide range of religious 
denominations joined the cause. Thirty-seven years later, abortion is perhaps the best 
contemporary example of the intertwined nature of politics and religion in the United 
States. The link between religion and opposition to abortion is based on a respect of 
God’s creation, a belief in the holiness and the unique value of human life, the 
importance of family, and a conservative view of sexuality. The most important linkage 
is the view that God’s creation is sacred, and that God’s children should be protected at 
all costs.  
The abortion issue was brought into presidential politics with the release of the 
1976 Democratic and Republican Party platforms, and while the Democratic platform 
supported Roe v. Wade, the Republican platform opposed it. Thirty-four years after it was 
first dealt with in a presidential campaign, abortion is still one of the most contentious 
and emotionally charged issues in American politics. For example, several studies have 
shown that abortion is “one of the few issues” that has consistently influenced “voting 
behavior” at all levels of U.S. government (Jelen & Wilcox 2003:489), and Jelen and 
Wilcox (2003:489) conclude that abortion is one of the few issues “in modern times” that 
has demonstrated such a “political force” that it has led parts of the electorate to change 
their party affiliation. Furthermore, evidence presented by Strickler and Danigelis 
(2002:200) suggests that passionate abortion opponents tend to be more politically active 
than passionate abortion proponents. If one adds the fact that a majority of Americans 
                                                
5
 The court’s seven-to-two decision nullified all previous state restrictions on abortion on the basis that 
such restrictions violated a constitutional right to privacy protected under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
 4 
have been more liberal on abortion than the Republican Party platforms in the period 
between 1976 and 2008 (General Social Survey 2008), it would be interesting to see how 
the party platform has evolved over time, and relevant to study the relationship between 
the party platforms’ conservative stance and Republican presidential candidates’, 
nominees’, and presidents’ positioning on abortion over time. 
With this as a backdrop, the thesis focuses on the Republican Party’s stance on 
abortion – as reflected in the party platforms – and on the relationship between the 
official party line on abortion as manifested in the platforms and the positioning on and 
framing of abortion among those running for, and among those who are elected, 
president. With this in mind, the thesis deals with the following research question: 
 
What is the relationship between the positioning on and framing of abortion 
among Republican presidential candidates, presidential nominees, and presidents, 
and the Republican Party platforms’ emphasis and positioning on, and framing of 
abortion in the period between 1976 and 2008? 
 
1.2 The role of party platforms in American presidential campaigns
6
 
The American political system is commonly referred to as a system where the candidate 
is more important than the party he or she represents. According to Herrnson (2002:47), 
both the Democratic and Republican campaign committees “have adapted to the 
candidate-centered … style of modern campaign politics”, and can thus be viewed as 
“electoral institutions” that “focus more on elections and less on initiating policy change 
than do parties in other Western democracies.” In the words of Bibby (2002:20), the 
American political parties have evolved into parties that operate “’in service’ to its 
candidates and officeholders”, without the ability to control them.  
Brox and Shaw (2006:146-147) provide the historical background to these 
developments. First of all, survey data from the 1940s and 1950s weakened the notion “of 
voters as attentive observers of the day-to-day events” and activities of political 
campaigns. Secondly, television fundamentally changed broadcasting, and could 
                                                
6
 The following section draws on the content of my term paper in STV4020, Fall 2008, entitled 
“Republican Party platforms on abortion: Methodological thoughts and reflections on a forthcoming 
research project.” The material is reworked and organized differently than it appeared in the term paper. 
 5 
“empower candidates at the expense of political parties.” Thirdly, the reform of the 
parties’ internal nomination processes in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a 
“forfeiture of party control over the nominating processes.” As candidates ran against 
each other in primaries, “they developed campaign organizations and expertise 
independent of the political party.” As a consequence of these developments, Brox and 
Shaw (2006:147) state that “by the late 1960s”, the United States “had entered a period of 
‘candidate-centered politics.’” 
What is the function of the party platform in this “candidate-centered” reality?  
Released during the national conventions that signal the start of the general election, the 
platforms spell out “principles and programs to be presented to the electorate” 
(Population and Development Review 1992:587). According to Ware (2006:272), 
“American parties do not … campaign on the basis of” party platforms during elections, 
and argues that party platforms “are general in nature,” that they “do not constitute a kind 
of promise to the electorate,” and that “the party’s candidates are not bound to support 
it.” Similarly, Truman considers party platforms as being “almost meaningless” (quoted 
in Walters 1990:437), and Maisel (1993:671) states that party platforms are “the most 
important document that a political party produces,” while they at the same time are close 
to being “worthless pieces of paper.”  
 Monroe (1983:27) presents some of the main theories regarding the making of 
policy within a two-party system such as the American. The party responsibility notion 
“holds that each party should formulate its policy proposals on the basis of ideology,” 
whereas the spatial explanation rests on “an economic rationality approach” that “argues 
that parties seeking to maximize voters will adopt ... stands ... that will tend to 
accomplish that goal” (Monroe 1983:27).  
 Page (1978) was not satisfied with the applicability of these theories, and thus 
suggested a ‘cleavage’ theory, according to which “parties must react to a variety of other 
forces” than the average voter when “determining their policy stances” (in Monroe 
1983:28). Party leaders, interest groups and activists both within and outside the party are 
examples of such forces. The ‘cleavage’ theory thus widens the scope of potential factors 
that can lead a political party to adopt positions that are not supported by a majority of 
the electorate.  
 6 
With this in mind, Monroe (1983:38) states that political parties rarely “advocate 
a … stand” contrary to that of a majority of public opinion, but that the “dynamics of the 
nominating process and convention decision making mean that minority positions 
favored by relevant interest groups and party activists may sometimes [be] adopted.” 
Monroe’s (1983:27) research supports this notion and demonstrates that the Republican 
and the Democratic Party have “tended to go against popular majorities on issues of 
greatest concern to their established constituencies.” The Republican Party platforms’ 
support of a ban on abortion seems to fit this profile. 
Walters (1990:437) points out that few studies have looked at party platforms and 
their political function. However, according to one of the predictions of saliency theory, 
as described by Laver and Garry (2000:620), a “strong relationship between party 
position on, and party emphasis” of an issue … ‘emphases equal direction.’” From this 
perspective, a link exists between a party’s focus on a specific issue, and the strength and 
weight of that party’s emphasis on that particular issue. According to saliency theory, 
then, if an analysis shows increased attention to the abortion issue within Republican 
Party platforms over time, this can be interpreted as the result of the party’s increased 
emphasis on its anti-abortion stance. 
 Although increased emphasis on a particular issue can be the result of various 
factors, the strength and well-being of the party’s base is surely one of the prevalent ones. 
Pomper sees party platforms as a “useful … indication of the nature of the party 
coalition” (in Walters 1990:437), and Walters (1990:437) adds that party activists are 
important in this regard since they are “skilled in identifying salient issues in the 
electorate.” Research by Monroe (1983:39) supports the notion that so-called “issue 
activists … performed the function of ‘linking’ the party agenda to national public 
policy” (Walters 1990:437). 
According to Domke and Coe (2008:103), party platforms are important because 
they are in fact “opportunities to narrowcast messages to targeted segments of the 
electorate,” and parties thus “create platforms knowing that engaged groups will look for 
distinct ‘planks’ … that discuss their pet concerns.” Domke and Coe (2008:73) define 
narrowcasting as the targeting of “a particular constituency with words and actions that 
are public but that fly below the radar of most Americans”, and the abortion plank is thus 
 7 
an important tool in the wooing of abortion opponents. Consequently, candidates can 
campaign on the abortion related content of the party platforms knowing that it is already 
“approved” by the pro-life community, and that their message will be well-received 
among those who are paying attention. 
 Framing is a key ingredient in narrowcasting, and it is an integral part of political 
debate – in which people tend to define their position in the best possible light, while 
trying to portray people with opposing views in the worst possible light.
7
 Aristotle 
described such a dynamic by stressing the rhetorical significance of promoting oneself, 
while dethroning one’s opponent (Krogstad 2004:11). The power of rhetoric and our 
understanding of language are based on different “frames”, which Lakoff (2004:xv) 
defines as “mental structures that shape the way we see the world.” Framing, then, as 
defined by Iyengar (1991:11), refers to “subtle alterations in the statement or presentation 
of judgment and choice problems.” In short, politicians are in the trade of actively 
seeking to shape and affect the media’s framing of themselves, their opponents, the 
policy issues they discuss, and last but not least, the voters’ perception of the issues at 
hand.  
Republican Party platforms’ stance and positioning on abortion is framed with a 
specific purpose, and this framing can be described by the term “value-framing.” Central 
to the concept of value-framing is the fact that the “distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
hings in the balance” (Ball-Rokeach et al. 1990:249), and opponents in such a 
“legitimacy contest” tend to confront each other “in the language of values,” cloaked in 
value-frames that “establish legitimacy (morality and/or competence) at the expense of 
their opponent” (Ball-Rokeach et al. 1990:255). If successful, the creation of a dominant 
value-frame can contribute “to a condition of ‘restrictive power,’” in which the public 
discourse occurs (Ball-Rokeach et al. 1990:255). I will return to the issue of framing in 
Chapters 2 and 3, in the candidate- and president-narratives in Chapters 4 and 5, and in 
the discussion in Chapter 6. In short, value-framing is central to Republican Party 
                                                
7
 Part of this section draws on the content of my term paper in STV4308B, Spring 2009, entitled “The 
Elephant, the Donkey, and the Framing of Abortion in American Politics.” The material is reworked and 
organized differently than it appeared in the original. 
 8 
platforms’, Republican presidential candidates’, nominees’, and presidents’ framing of 
abortion.  
1.3 The relationship between the party platforms and the party’s nominees 
As previously mentioned, the prevailing view of American party platforms is that they 
are “almost meaningless” (Walters 1990:437), and that while they on the one hand are 
“the most important document that a political party produces,” they are close to being 
“worthless pieces of paper” (Maisel 1993:671). If party platforms are indeed almost 
meaningless documents consisting of worthless pieces of paper, presidential candidates, 
nominees, and presidents will not bother adhering to its positions or applying its language 
in speeches or statements. By focusing on the abortion issue, the thesis seeks to unravel 
the relationship between the Republican Party platform on the one hand, and Republican 
presidential candidates’, nominees’, and presidents’ positioning on and framing of 
abortion on the other. 
 The fact that the average voter does not read American party platforms simply 
implies that they are primarily written for a different audience. As Walters (1990:438) 
points out, the party platform performs at least two “crucial political functions” in 
addition to defining the party and the party’s nominee politically in the campaign 
environment. It also “binds campaign organizations together” and binds together “various 
constituency groups and provide a basis for their mobilization” (Walters 1990:438). The 
party platform can thus be seen as a uniting factor within the party coalition, and as a tool 
in the mobilization of the greater electorate. 
If I can demonstrate the existence of a clear relationship between the party 
platforms’, and the candidates’, nominees’, and presidents’ treatment of the abortion 
issue, then this would weaken the notion that party platforms are close to being worthless 
pieces of paper. In fact, a dichotomy of whether party platforms are important or not is 
useless, since Republican Party platforms can be worthless pieces of paper to the average 
voter, and a list of commandments to abide by to Republicans with presidential 
ambitions. Furthermore, the existence of a clear relationship would shed light on the 
process surrounding the party platforms’ “defining” of “the party’s nominee politically” 
(Walters 1990:438). Since the Republican Party platforms’ abortion plank has opposed 
 9 
abortion since 1976, the platform not only defines the candidate politically, but it also 
advocates a party line – regardless of the nominee’s personal stance on abortion. In this 
perspective, revisions of party platforms are not only aimed at pleasing specific 
constituency groups and party loyalists, but they also function as a message to the party’s 
presidential hopefuls about the desired positioning on a range of issues come election 
time.  
If this is the case, the notion of the “candidate-centered” reality of American 
politics would sound strange, and the premise that American party platforms are 
unimportant would be weakened – based on a finding that Republican Party platforms 
matter to Republican presidential candidates, nominees, and presidents on the issue of 
abortion. Although my analysis of the party platforms is conducted against the backdrop 
of scholarly perspectives on the importance and significance of these platforms, my 
analysis of the abortion issue within Republican Party platforms is not primarily aimed at 
assessing the importance of American Party platforms per se. It can, however, be viewed 
as an effort to assess the importance of the Republican Party platforms’ abortion plank, 
by contrasting it to the presidential candidates’, nominees’, and presidents’ positioning on 
abortion. 
My findings only relate to the Republican Party’s treatment of the abortion issue 
in presidential politics, and it shines light on the past three decades, in which the clout of 
“social conservatives”, according to the National Catholic Register (2007), “was such 
that any candidate had to undergo a ‘forced conversion’ before running for national 
office.” During the 2008 Republican primaries, the Republican presidential candidate 
Mike Huckabee alluded to such developments when he uttered his amazement “at the 
number of people who come to the conclusion to be pro-life when it comes time to run 
for president” (Nagourney et al. 2007). From the sidelines, candidates’ rightward drift on 
abortion reeks of political convenience, and Darman (2008:43) has summed it up nicely: 
“too many candidates have offered conversion narratives that track too perfectly with the 
course of political expediency.”  
 
 10 
1.4 Litmus Test Conformity 
The title of this thesis is “Litmus Test Conformity in American Politics: Republican Party 
platforms and the Presidential Politics of Abortion, 1976-2008.” My use of the terms 
“litmus test” and “conformity” warrants a few remarks. 
First of all, the term “litmus test” is commonly used in journalistic accounts of 
politics and religion, and it refers to matters where a specific policy stance qualifies or 
disqualifies a candidate for a certain office, post or job. For example, presidential 
candidates on both sides are routinely asked whether or not they would conduct a litmus 
test when choosing nominees to the Supreme Court, and the Republican Party platform 
includes language stating that it supports judges “who respect … the sanctity of innocent 
human life.”  
In the present context, the litmus test analogy alludes to the difficulties of pro-
choice Republicans seeking the presidency, based on the fact that the Republican 
presidential nominee has to support the party line on abortion. Obviously, there are no 
formal test results, but a certain perception of acceptability or unacceptability emerges 
among party loyalists and Republican primary voters informed about the candidates’ 
stance on abortion. The logic behind the use of the analogy is that an anti-abortion stance 
is tightly connected with the party’s socially conservative image, and that candidates who 
support abortion rights are not are suitable – or eligible – to head such a coalition. 
Outside the world of politics, a litmus test measures pH levels. PH levels below 7 
are defined as acid and turn out red, whereas pH levels above 7 are defined as base and 
turn out blue. Taking the analogy one step further, a pro-choice stance turns out red – 
signaling a stop sign – whereas a pro-life stance turns out blue – signaling blue skies and 
one less obstacle on the road towards the nomination. Furthermore, a pro-choice stance 
registers as acid, whereas the Republican base favors a pro-life stance. Taking one step 
back, the litmus test analogy simply alludes to the importance of a pro-life stance on 
abortion on the road towards obtaining the Republican presidential nomination. 
Secondly, my use of the term “conformity” refers to the fact that since 1976, all 
Republican presidential and vice-presidential nominees have voiced their pro-life views 
and pledged allegiance to the party platform’s abortion plank. Thus, pro-choice views are 
in the minority, and candidates with pro-choice views seem to face a much steeper climb 
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to obtain the Republican presidential nomination than pro-life Republicans do. In short, it 
appears as if pro-choice Republicans who are serious about seeking the presidency need 
to shape and conform their abortion stance in accordance with the party platform.  
The combination of these terms – “litmus test conformity” – alludes to the thesis’ 
findings. In short, one specific position on abortion seems to disqualify Republicans with 
presidential ambitions, and with the benefit of hindsight, “litmus test results” seem to 
push candidates to conform, and drift rightwards on abortion. 
1.5 Plan of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the method of 
content analysis and presents the thesis’ research strategy. Chapter 3 analyzes the 
abortion related content of Republican Party platforms between 1976 and 2008 by 
focusing on emphasis, positioning, and framing. Chapter 4 lays out Republican 
presidential candidates’ and nominees’ positioning on and framing of abortion in the time 
periods covered by a set of news searches, and Chapter 5 does the same for Republican 
presidents based on their publicly available documents. Chapter 6 includes a discussion 
of the thesis’ findings and widens the scope of their potential implications. Chapter 7 
summarizes the thesis’ findings and points out areas for future research on the subject. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with methodological considerations underlying the thesis’ analysis. It 
presents the method of content analysis and the thesis’ research strategy, and lays out, 
step by step, how the research is conducted.  
My analysis of the positioning on and framing of abortion in (I) Republican Party 
platforms, and among Republican (II) presidential candidates and nominees, and (III) 
presidents, is based on textual analysis. As the study of these three levels of textual data 
primarily includes (counting and) tracing of words and phrases, content analysis seems to 
fit the analytical purposes well.  
2.2 Content analysis
8
 
Content analysis is quantitative and instrumental in nature, and involves counting and 
tracing (of words) more than interpretation. Krippendorff (2004:18) defines content 
analysis as ”a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts ... 
to the contexts of their use”, and states that the approach can “cope with large volumes of 
data” (Krippendorff 2004:42). The issue of validity is closely connected to the issue of 
reliability, and these two concepts are viewed as ”methodological requirements” within a 
content analytical framework (Krippendorff 2004:18). ”Validating evidence” is seen as 
”the ultimate justification of content analysis” (Krippendorff 2004:89), and Weber 
(1990:12) notes that in order to make valid inferences from a text, ”it is important that the 
classification procedure” is ”reliable in the sense of being consistent,” meaning that 
”different people should code the same text in the same way.” Ontologically, then, 
content analysis is ”realist” by assuming ”that an independent reality exists” within a 
text; and epistemologically, ”meaning is fixed and reflects reality in ways that can be 
ascertained through the use of scientific methods” (Hardy et al. 2004:21). More 
                                                
8
 The following section draws on the content of my term paper in STV4312B, Fall 2009, entitled 
“Republican Party platforms on abortion, 1976-2008.” The material is reworked and organized differently 
than it appeared in the original. 
 13 
specifically, content analysis relies on logical positivism, which holds that assertions are 
only meaningful if they can be tested through observation (Knutsen 1997:217). 
In applying a content analytical approach, it is important that all of the steps in the 
gathering and analysis of the textual data are thoroughly accounted for. I have described 
all of the relevant word searches, word counts and coding procedures in detail below. 
Thus, the analysis I have conducted, and the results it has produced, are both readily 
replicated.  
2.2.1 The Manifesto-approach to the analysis of party platforms 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, scholars differ on the importance of party platforms. 
Nonetheless, the party platform is the single most important document produced and 
released by a political party, and it is an important piece of data when studying a political 
party’s treatment of a particular issue.  
 Part of my analysis of the Republican Party platforms is based on the so-called 
Manifesto-approach. The Manifesto Research Group’s (MRG) focus on the content of 
election programs is driven by the fact that such texts represent important and 
authoritative statements of a political party’s priorities (Klingemann et al. 1994:21). The 
Manifesto-approach consists of coding sentences into 56 categories, grouped within 
seven different policy domains. The focus on sentences rests on the fact that party 
platforms are “carefully considered and finely honed documents,” in which no sentences 
appear “without a purpose” (Budge 2001:79). The essence of the Manifesto-approach is 
that the percentage of sentences grouped within the various categories and domains can 
be studied in comparative analyses between different party platforms over time. 
 The theoretical perspective underlying the Manifesto-approach is one of saliency. 
Saliency theory ”sees parties as trying to make ‘their’ issues prominent in an election (by 
highlighting them in their manifestos) and de-emphasizing rival issues” (Budge & Bara 
2001:62). Saliency can be defined as ”the selective emphasis given to issues by parties” 
(Budge 2001:79), and as Budge (2001:87) points out, ”all computerized procedures based 
on word counts base themselves on the relative saliency of words.” In the present work, I 
use a Manifesto-like-approach to focus on the selective emphasis given to the issue of 
abortion within Republican Party platforms between 1976 and 2008. Saliency is 
”measured” by four different measurements of saliency: The number of words describing 
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the platforms’ positioning on abortion (relative to the total amount of words within the 
party platform), the numerical mentions of the word ”abortion”, the number of abortion 
related policy positions, and the number of abortion frames within Republican Party 
platforms over time.  
While the Manifesto-approach is focused on the coding of sentences, the 
Wordscore-approach focuses on the counting of words. As Budge (2001:90) points out,  
“specialized investigations may well need their own specialized codings”, and so my 
approach can be described as a triangulation of methods: In addition to focusing on the 
percentage of words within party platforms dealing with abortion (as opposed to the 
Manifesto-approach’s focus on the number/percentage of sentences) and conducting 
various word counts, I code abortion related words and sentences within Republican 
Party platforms into policy positions.   
In short, while the Manifesto-approach is applied with respect to the emphasis on 
abortion within Republican Party platforms, a different content analytical approach is 
applied in the mapping and analysis of the positioning on and framing of abortion within 
Republican Party platforms between 1976 and 2008. All in all, the emphasis is on the 
tracing, counting and coding of words and policies, and the details of the research 
strategy are described below.  
2.3 Research strategy  
The thesis question involves an analysis of textual data on three different levels: the (I) 
emphasis and positioning on, and the framing of abortion within Republican Party 
platforms, and the positioning and framing among Republican (II) presidential candidates 
and nominees, and (III) presidents. With this in mind, Figure 2.1 illustrates the thesis’ 
independent and dependent variable. 
The first level of analysis, described as the independent variable in Figure 2.1, 
focuses on Republican Party platforms’ emphasis and positioning on, and framing of 
abortion – from the first time abortion was mentioned in 1976 up until the 2008 version 
of the platform. Levels two and three represent the dependent variables in Figure 2.1. The 
second level consists of data gathered from news searches focusing on the candidates’ 
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and nominees’ stance on abortion, while the third level consists of data gathered from 
Republican presidents’ (1974-2009) publicly available documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Independent and dependent variables  
 
2.3.1 Republican Party platforms 
The data on level one – Republican Party platforms (1976-2008) – are available online 
from The American Presidency Project (2009a). My emphasis is solely on the abortion 
related content of these platforms, and the approach thus differs from that of Maisel 
(1993), who has conducted a detailed content analysis of the various drafts of the 1992 
Democratic and Republican Party platforms. Maisel used the paragraph as the unit of 
analysis. Since my focus is solely on the issue of abortion within Republican Party 
platforms, my units of analysis are the (I) paragraphs including the word abortion. In 
instances where sentences including the word abortion appear in a (II) paragraph dealing 
with a wide range of issues in addition to abortion (for example, a listing of various GOP
9
 
priorities), only the sentence including the word abortion will be extracted. The textual 
data extracted in this manner (I and II) will be referred to as “abortion words.” The total 
amount of words within each party platform will be referred to as “platform words.” 
Word counts of the abortion words
10
 and the platform words
11
 are conducted in 
every single party platform in order to measure the saliency of the former when compared 
to the latter. By applying such an approach, it is possible to determine whether the 
                                                
9
 GOP – short for the Grand Old Party – is a commonly used acronym for the Republican Party. 
10
 Headlines are not included in the word counts of the “abortion words.”  
11
 Footnotes and endnotes are not included in the word counts, which begin with the ”preamble” in each 
platform document. In 2004, the names of the members of the platform committee listed at the end of the 
document, and the table of contents at the beginning, is not included in the count. The counting starts at 
”Ronald Reagan believed that ...” In 2008, the  counting starts at ”This platform is dedicated ...” 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  
Republican Party platforms’ emphasis and positioning on, and framing of abortion (I)  
(1976-2008) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE(S):  
(II) Republican presidential candidates/nominees and (III) presidents positioning on and 
framing of abortion (1976-2008) 
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coverage of the abortion issue has increased in prominence over time relative to the total 
length of the party platforms. Similarly, word counts of the word ”abortion” are 
conducted within the various party platforms in order to reveal whether or not the use of 
the term has increased over time. 
 In addition to focusing on the saliency of the abortion words and the appearance 
of the word “abortion” over time, I also focus on abortion related policy positions and the 
framing of abortion within the various party platforms. The coding of policy positions
12
 is 
based on the abortion words extracted from the party platforms, and the coding procedure 
adheres to the following principles: There can be more than one policy within each 
sentence, and different ways of describing a policy position within different party 
platforms can be coded in the same manner. In addition to coding policy positions, I pay 
specific attention to the framing of abortion. Based on the extracted abortion words, I 
focus on certain words and phrases used to frame the abortion issue. I refer to these 
words and phrases as “abortion frames.” Abortion frames can be described as terms and 
slogans touting the GOP’s approach to, and positioning on abortion.  The abortion related 
policy positions and the abortion frames found within the various party platforms are 
presented at the end of Chapter 3, and an appendix containing the (I) Republican Party 
platforms (1976-2008), (II) the abortion words extracted from the various party 
platforms, the (III) details of the various policy-codings and (IV) abortion frames, and the 
candidate- and president-narratives are available on the CD accompanying this thesis.
13
  
2.3.2 Republican presidential candidates, nominees, and presidents 
The data on level two – Republican presidential candidates’ and nominees’ positioning on 
and framing of abortion – are based on a variety of news searches within the archives of 
The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Time Magazine, and Newsweek,
14
 in addition to 
Presidential Nomination Acceptance speeches and presidential debates including the 
word “abortion” (The American Presidency Project 2009b; 2009c). As far as the news 
                                                
12
 By an abortion related policy position I mean a stance on abortion, in the form of a plan, a course of 
action, a commitment to, or the support of a broad or specific cause. In short, promises and/or statements of 
intent pertaining to the issue of abortion.  
13
 The “CD appendix” is also available upon request from the author: are_flaten@hotmail.com. 
14
 I conducted the news searches within LexisNexis’ search engine and Google News’ Advanced News 
Archive Search-engine. Read more about the news searches in the Appendix.  
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searches’ search criteria go, I have treated candidates running for the first and second 
time differently. In order to try to track the candidates’ positioning on and framing of 
abortion over time, the searches for candidates running for the first time stretches back 
ten years from Election Day in the presidential election in question. In this way, it is 
possible to track the candidates’ (some of them end up as nominees) positioning on and 
framing of abortion in the time leading up to, during, and following the Republican 
primaries.  
However, when it comes to the searches for candidates running for the second 
time, the time period covered stretches from Election Day in the presidential election in 
question, and back to the day after Election Day in the previous presidential election in 
which the candidate ran. I will illustrate with an example: When covering Bob Dole, the 
first search covers the period between November 8, 1978 and November 8, 1988 
(Election Day in 1988), while the second search covers the period between November 9, 
1988 and November 5, 1996 (Election Day in 1996). 
All news searches included the following terms: a set of specified dates, the name 
of the candidate, and the words “abortion” and “pro.” “Pro” is a relevant search term 
since it is part of the two main terms used to describe a person’s positioning on abortion: 
“pro-choice” and “pro-life.” Furthermore, these terms are well known and frequently 
used by journalists covering politics and abortion. Thus, they appear in most articles 
dealing with abortion, but a direct consequence of including the word “pro” was a 
reduction of the data material and the exclusion of potentially useful articles. However, a 
reduction of the empirical material was the only feasible research strategy due to the huge 
amount of news articles retrieved by only searching for the word “abortion.” Nonetheless, 
the data material underlying the thesis’ analysis is extensive.
15
  
The data on level three – Republican presidents’ positioning on and framing of 
abortion – are based on The American Presidency Project’s archive of the presidents’ 
publicly available documents.
16
 As the data on levels two and three will be compared to 
                                                
15
 For example, the analysis in Chapter 4 is based on 580 articles (1881 pages) for the 2008 candidates, 
1004 articles (2673 pages) for the 2000 candidates, and 827 articles (2234 pages) for the 1996 candidates. 
16
 The data material is accessed by entering www.presidency.ucsb.edu, and by scrolling down until the 
boxes with the search options appear. In the box titled ”Option 1: Search”, type in the word ”abortion”, 
 18 
the abortion related content of Republican Party platforms (level one), the data will be 
compared to the content of the “newest” party platform at any given time. As an example, 
President George Bush’ one term as president will be dealt with as follows: Sources from 
the period between January 20, 1989 and August 16, 1992 will be compared with the 
1988 Republican Party Platform. As the 1992 Republican Party Platform was released on 
August 17, 1992, the sources from that day until Bush’s last day in office on January 20, 
1993, will be compared against the 1992 Republican Party Platform. 
The abortion related content of the party platforms is compared to abortion related 
statements in order to try to track eventual changes in tone and approach following the 
release of a new party platform. However, since the party platforms have been 
consistently “Pro-Life” for a long time, it might be hard to track clear changes following 
the release of new party platforms. I focus on this particular issue towards the end of 
Chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, it is possible that candidates tune their positioning 
on and framing of abortion based on the perceived or expected content of future party 
platforms, thus making the effect of new party platforms harder to trace. According to 
this logic, it is feasible that candidates who run for the presidency for a second time 
adjust their abortion strategy based on the perception of how it played out for them the 
first time. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 6.  
 Summing up, Table 2.1 lists the different research strategies and the relevant data 
sources for the three different levels of analysis. 
 
Table 2.1 The thesis’ three levels of analysis  
ANALYTICAL LEVEL RESEARCH STRATEGY SOURCES 
I Republican Party 
platforms 
Paragraphs and/or sentences including 
the word “abortion” 
The American Presidency 
Project (2009a) 
II Republican 
presidential 
candidates and  
nominees 
(1.) News searches including name, a set 
of dates, and the words “abortion” and 
“pro.” 
(2.) Nomination speeches and (3.) 
general election debates including the 
word “abortion.” 
1. The New York Times, 
Chicago Tribune, Time 
Magazine and Newsweek. 
2-3. The American 
Presidency Project 
(2009c+d) 
III Republican 
presidents 
Official presidential documents 
including the word “abortion”  
The American Presidency 
Project 
                                                
choose the relevant time period, choose the president of interest in the box titled ”President”, mark the box 
titled ”Exclude documents from the Office of the Press Secretary”, and hit the ”Send In” button.  
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2.3.3 Limiting the scope of analysis 
Obviously, the step-by-step research strategy sketched out above accumulates a large 
amount of textual data. Consequentially, some decisions were made to limit the scope of 
the analysis. First of all, and as previously mentioned, I included the word “pro” in the 
news searches to limit the number of retrieved news articles to a workable amount. 
Secondly, I focused exclusively on the top five candidacies, nationally, in every 
Republican presidential primary between 1976 and 2008.
17
 So-called “unpledged” votes
18
 
ranking second to fifth are ignored, and candidates originally ranking sixth (and so on) 
are not included. 
 Speaking of presidential candidates; when an incumbent president is running for 
reelection, he faces very few contenders for the presidential nomination. Furthermore, 
some of the candidacies are neither realistic, nor well covered by the news media. Simply 
put, some candidates are not mainstream material – such as the former Ku Klux Klan-
member David Duke, who ran as a Republican presidential candidate in 1992. Others 
seek the presidency over and over again, such as the 1984 Republican presidential 
candidate Harold Stassen – a perennial candidate who ran for the presidency ten times 
between 1944 and 1992. With such considerations in mind, the 1984 candidacies of 
Harold Stassen and Benjamin Fernandez, the 1992 candidacy of David Duke, and the 
2004 candidacy of Bill Wyatt have been left out of the analysis.  
However, I have not left out all presidential candidates who ran against an 
incumbent Republican president. I have included the 1976 candidacy of Ronald Reagan 
and the 1992 candidacy of Pat Buchanan. Unlike Stassen, Fernandez, Duke, and Wyatt, 
Reagan and Buchanan received a significant amount of attention in the news media, and a 
substantial number of votes in the Republican primaries. Coincidentally, both Reagan and 
Buchanan pushed their opponents further to the right on the abortion issue by making it 
an important issue in their campaigns. 
With these considerations in mind, Table 2.2 lists the Republican presidential 
candidates, presidential nominees, and presidents covered in this thesis.  
                                                
17
 I am relying on ourcampigns.com (1976, 1980, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000) and uselectionatlas.org (2008) 
for the Republican primary results. 
18
 “Unpledged” votes are votes cast for no specific candidate during the national convention. By casting an 
unpledged vote a convention delegate states that he’s not supporting a specific candidate. 
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Table 2.2 Republican presidential candidates, nominees, and presidents, 1976-2008 
YEAR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES and NOMINEES PRESIDENTS 
1976 Gerald Ford (nominee) and Ronald Reagan   
 
Gerald Ford 
(August 9, 1974 - 
January 20, 1977) 
1980 Ronald Reagan (nominee), George Bush, John Anderson*, 
Howard Baker, and Phil Crane  
1984 Ronald Reagan** 
Ronald Reagan 
(January 20, 1981 - 
January 20, 1989) 
1988 George Bush (nominee), Bob Dole, Pat Robertson, and Jack 
Kemp 
1992 George Bush (nominee) and Pat Buchanan  
George Bush 
(January 20, 1989 - 
January 20, 1993)  
1996 Bob Dole (nominee), Pat Buchanan, Steve Forbes, Lamar 
Alexander, and Alan Keyes  
 
2000 George W. Bush (nominee), John McCain, Alan Keyes, and 
Steve Forbes  
2004 George W. Bush** 
2008 John McCain (nominee), Mike Huckabee, Mitt Romney, Ron 
Paul, and Fred Thompson  
George W. Bush 
(January 20, 2001 - 
January 20, 2009) 
 
Note: *John Anderson ran as a Republican, but bowed out of the primaries on April 24, 1980, and ran as an 
Independent. **Ronald Reagan’s and George W. Bush’s reelection bids are covered in Chapter 5. 
 
2.3.4 Coding abortion related statements 
As Carmines and Woods (2002:375-276) show, the norm within survey questionnaires on 
questions dealing with one’s positioning on abortion is to operate with four different 
categories, ranging from totally opposed to abortion to favoring a woman’s right to 
choose. Although my analysis of presidential candidates’, nominees’ and presidents’ 
positioning on abortion relies on statements retrieved from a variety of news searches and 
not responses to survey questionnaires, I have decided to stick with this four-category 
formula. In doing so, however, I have modified the name and content of one of the four 
categories applied in the main abortion question in the National Election Studies (NES) 
since 1980, and in the Convention Delegate Studies (CDS) since 1992.  
The category in question is that which in my terminology is “Wishy-Washy” (see 
Table 2.3). The original category within the NES and CDS studies was the following: 
“The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the 
woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established” 
(Carmines & Woods 2002:375). After completing the news searches and organizing the 
textual data, it became apparent that this category would be difficult to handle. Very few 
of the statements retrieved from the news searches are so specific that they fit this 
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category. However, a far more common theme in the data material is the wishy-
washiness of various candidates’ description of their own positioning on abortion. Some 
are unwilling to pinpoint their own positioning, while others simply duck the issue. 
Furthermore, a candidate’s recurring repositioning on the abortion issue fits the “Wishy-
Washy” category.  
 
Table 2.3 Coding abortion related statements based on a four-category schema  
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION/THEME 
PRO-CHOICE A woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a 
matter of personal choice. 
WISHY-WASHY Unwilling to state one’s position, AND/OR 
Ducking the issue, AND/OR 
Constant repositioning 
PRO-LIFE with exceptions Abortion should only be legal in cases of rape, incest, and 
when the woman’s life is in danger. 
PRO-LIFE Abortion is only permissible to save the woman’s life. 
Note: The categories (except the “Wishy-Washy” category and my inclusion of “save the woman’s life” 
exception in the “Pro-Life” category) are based on the ones applied in the main abortion question in the 
NES studies since 1980, and the CDS since 1992 (See Carmines & Woods 2002:375). 
 
In addition to creating the “Wishy-Washy” category, I have rephrased the “Pro-Life” 
category to include exceptions for self-defense – meaning cases where the mother will 
die if the child is born. Although the party platforms do not mention this exception, it is 
supported by the Judeo-Christian tradition on the premise that you can take someone 
else’s life if that is your only chance of surviving. Even Ronald Reagan supported this 
exception (The American Presidency Project 1984a).  
The material retrieved from the news searches and the searches within the 
presidential documents has been coded according to the four-category schema. The 
relevant textual data for each candidate, nominee and president has been organized in 
individual timelines, including the date, the quote, the coding and the framing.
19
 Before 
considering this material, however, I will first focus on Republican Party platforms and 
their emphasis and positioning on, and framing of abortion in the period between 1976 
and 2008. 
 
 
                                                
19
 The timelines are included on the CD accompanying this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Republican Party platforms on Abortion, 1976-2008 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the emphasis and positioning on, and the framing of abortion 
within Republican Party platforms between 1976 and 2008.
20
 It serves as an empirical 
foundation for the analyses reported in Chapters 4 and 5. The content of the Republican 
Party platforms are dealt with according to the principles described in Chapter 2.  
The chapter starts out by mapping the varying saliency of the abortion issue 
within Republican Party platforms over time, before the various abortion related policy 
positions are presented chronologically, and the contexts underlying their introduction, 
molding and exclusion are briefly discussed. Lastly, the chapter deals with the various 
party platforms’ framing of abortion. 
3.2 Saliency and emphasis  
Since 1976, every Republican Party platform has mentioned the issue of abortion. 
However, the emphasis – measured by comparing the abortion words to the platform 
words – has evolved over time. Below, Table 3.1 shows the percentages of abortion 
words within Republican Party platforms, 1976-2008:  
 
Table 3.1 Abortion words within Republican Party platforms, 1976-2008. Percent. 
 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Abortion 
words % 
.81 .30 .61 .61 .57 1.23 .94 1.12 1.89 
Change  -.51 +.31  
(-.20) 
 
 
-.04 
(-.24) 
+.66 
(+.42) 
-.29 
(+.13) 
+.18 
(+.31) 
+.77 
(+1.08) 
Note: Abortion words = the abortion related material within the party platform. Platform words = the total 
amount of words within the party platform. The percentages are obtained by comparing the number of 
abortion words to the number of platform words. The numbers in parenthesis in the last row compare the 
abortion words percentage to the abortion words percentage of the 1976 party platform. Source: The 
American Presidency Project (2009a). 
 
                                                
20
 Different versions of Tables 3.1-3.8 were originally included in my term paper in STV4312B, Fall 2009, 
entitled “Republican Party platforms on abortion, 1976-2008”, but the presentation here is different. 
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As Table 3.1 shows, the relative emphasis on abortion within Republican Party platforms 
has increased over time. However, the trend is not linear, as there was a decline in the 
relative emphasis on the abortion issue on three occasions – between the party platforms 
of 1976 and 1980, 1988 and 1992, and 1996 and 2000, respectively. Furthermore, the 
increasing emphasis on abortion is particularly evident between the party platforms of 
1992 and 1996, and 2004 and 2008. In order to get a clearer picture of the pattern over 
time, the party platforms are grouped into three different time periods in Table 3.2: 
 
Table 3.2 Abortion words split into three time periods: 1976-1984, 1988-1996, and 
2000-2008. Percent. Mean. 
 1976-1984 1988-1996 2000-2008 
Abortion words % .57 .80 1.32 
Change  +.23 +.52  
(+.75) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a). 
 
By grouping the party platforms in this manner, the pattern of increased emphasis on 
abortion over time clearly stands out. The percentage of words dealing with the abortion 
issue has more than doubled in the period between 1976 and 2008. By viewing this as a 
measurement of saliency, it is evident that the issue of abortion has become increasingly 
important within Republican Party platforms over time. 
 Another way of measuring the importance of the abortion issue within the various 
party platforms is based on a similar but more simplistic approach: word counts of the 
word “abortion” within the various party platforms. The results are shown in Table 3.3: 
 
Table 3.3 The number of times the word abortion is mentioned within Republican 
Party platforms, 1976-2008.  
 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Abortion w. count 5 3 6 6 4 11 8 12 12 
Change  -2 +3  -2 +7 -3 +4  
   (+1) (+1) (-1) (+6) (+3) (+7) (+7) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a). 
 
Clearly, the use of the word abortion has increased over time. The pattern in Table 3.3 is 
not one of linear increase over time, but when the party platforms are grouped into three 
time periods, such as in Table 3.4 below, the pattern of a clear increase over time is 
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evident. The use of the word “abortion” has more than doubled when comparing the first 
group of party platforms (1976-1984) to the third (2000-2008): 
 
Table 3.4 Abortion word counts grouped into three time periods. Mean. 
 1976-1984 1988-1996 2000-2008 
Abortion w. count 4.6 7 10.6 
Change  +2.4 +3.6 
   (+6) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a). 
 
A third approach to measuring the saliency of the abortion issue within Republican Party 
platforms is based on a count of abortion related policy positions within the various party 
platforms. Based on the policy-coding procedure described in Chapter 2, Table 3.5 shows 
a pattern of an increasing number of abortion related policy positions over time: 
 
Table 3.5 The number of abortion related policy positions within Republican Party 
platforms, 1976-2008. 
 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Abortion policies 3 4 8 10 10 13 13 17 15 
Change  +1 +4 +2  +3  +4 -2 
   (+5) (+7) (+7) (+10) (+10) (+14) (+12) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a).  
 
The pattern is much clearer here than in the previous tables. The only exception to the 
pattern of a steadily increasing number of abortion related policy positions over time is 
the 2008 party platform, which nonetheless included more policy positions than the other 
party platforms with the exception of the 2004 version. The party platforms have been 
grouped into three different time periods in Table 3.6: 
 
Table 3.6 Abortion related policy positions within Republican Party platforms 
grouped into three time periods. Mean. 
 1976-1984 1988-1996 2000-2008 
Abortion policies 5 11 15 
Change  +6 +4 
   (+10) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a).  
 
When the nine party platforms are divided into three separate groups, it becomes clear 
that the number of abortion related policy positions doubled between the first group 
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(1976-1984) and the second (1988-1996), while tripling between the first (1976-1984) 
and the third group (2000-2008) of party platforms. Furthermore, when comparing the 
1976 to the 2008 party platform, the number of policy positions quintupled – from three 
policy positions to fifteen. 
 A fourth approach to measuring the saliency of abortion within Republican Party 
platforms is to count the number of abortion frames used to describe the platforms’ 
position on abortion. Based on the principles described in Chapter 2, the tables below tell 
the quantitative story of the party platforms’ framing of abortion:  
 
Table 3.7 Abortion frames within Republican Party platforms, 1976-2008. 
 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Abortion frames 3 2 5 6 6 10 10 17 14 
Change  -1 +3 +1  +4  +7 -3 
   (+2) (+3) (+3) (+7) (+7) (+14) (+11) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a).  
 
Again the pattern is clear, and only two party platforms break with the linear trend. The 
trend of a clear increase in the number of abortion frames over time, however, stands out 
when the nine party platforms are divided into three groups: 
 
Table 3.8 Abortion frames within Republican Party platforms grouped into three 
time periods. Mean. 
 1976-1984 1988-1996 2000-2008 
Abortion frames 3.3 7.3 13.6 
Change  +4 +6.3 
   (+10.3) 
Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a).  
 
As Table 3.8 shows, the number of abortion frames found within Republican Party 
platforms quadrupled in the period between 1976 and 2008. Thus, the four different 
measurements of saliency (abortion words percentages, the number of times the word 
“abortion” appeared, the number of abortion related policy positions, and the number of 
abortion frames) all tell the same story, namely that Republican Party platforms focused 
more and more on the issue of abortion in the period between 1976 and 2008. However, 
the various measurements tell a slightly different story about which party platforms had 
the highest and the lowest emphasis on abortion. The abortion words percentages and the 
counts of the word “abortion” show that the emphasis was at its lowest in 1980, followed 
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by 1992. According to the number of abortion frames the emphasis was at its lowest in 
1980, followed by 1976, while the number of policy positions shows that the emphasis 
was at its lowest in 1976, followed by 1980. According to the abortion words 
percentages, the emphasis was at its highest in 2008, followed by 1996 and 2004, while 
the counts of the word “abortion” show that the emphasis was at its highest in 2008 and 
2004, followed by 1996. According to the number of policy positions on abortion, the 
emphasis was at its highest in 2004, followed by 2008, while the number of abortion 
frames shows that the emphasis was at its highest in 2004, followed by 2008. 
Summed up quantitatively, Republican Party platforms’ emphasis on the abortion 
issue has increased substantially in the period between 1976 and 2008. By shifting the 
focus to the qualitative nature of the abortion related sections within the party platforms, I 
will now introduce the various abortion related policy positions found in the platforms, 
before I end the chapter by focusing on the platforms’ framing of abortion. 
3.3 Policy positions
21
  
All previously existing state restrictions on abortion were deemed unconstitutional by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade in 1973. Abortion was legalized, and three 
years later, in 1976, the Republican Party platform introduced its stance on the issue. The 
1976 party platform stated that it was in favor of a continuation of the public dialogue on 
abortion [policy 1], while at the same time stating that it supported a constitutional 
amendment to protect the rights to life for unborn children [policy 2].
22
 Furthermore, the 
platform also opposed the Supreme Court’s intrusion into the family structure, which 
according to the party platform denied parent’s the right and obligation to guide their 
minor children [policy 3]. This policy was dropped in 1984. 
 In 1980, the language favoring a continuation of the public dialogue on abortion 
[policy 1] was dropped, and replaced by language recognizing differing views on the 
                                                
21
 The abortion related policy positions are introduced in the order of their appearance within the party 
platforms. The numbers in the brackets signify the policies’ appearance. 
22
 Since 1984, Republican Party platforms have supported a human life amendment to the Constitution. 
Several versions of this amendment exist, but they all share the intention to overturn Roe v. Wade and 
protect the life of the unborn. Back in 1974, The National Committee for a Human Life Amendment 
(NCHLA) had been created by Catholic bishops as a (lobby) group independent of the Catholic Church, 
because of an American public that “frowns on any official church role in pressure or electoral politics” 
(Craig & O’Brien 1993:44). 
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abortion issue among both Americans in general, and within the Republican Party more 
specifically [policy 4]. This policy was dropped in 1984. The fates of these two policies 
allude to the Republican Party’s initial positioning on the abortion issue – a positioning 
that was completed by 1984. From 1984 onwards, the Republican Party was firmly “Pro-
Life”, and did not reach out to abortion proponents. 
The 1980 party platform also created a link between the abortion issue and 
economic policy, and introduced a policy of opposing the use of public revenues for the 
performance of abortions [policy 5]. Four years later, the 1984 party platform pledged to 
eliminate funding for organizations advocating or supporting abortion [policy 6]. On a 
similar note, the platform document that laid the framework for Ronald Reagan’s second 
term pledged to eliminate U.S. funding for organizations supporting abortion or research 
on abortion methods [policy 7].
23
  
 In addition to these economic policies, the 1984 party platform introduced 
language stating that the unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which 
cannot be infringed [policy 8], and that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections should 
apply to children [policy 9].
24
 The 1984 platform also pledged to support those who 
provide positive alternatives to abortion, such as adoption [policy 10]. Furthermore, the 
platform voiced its support of judges who respect traditional family values and the 
sanctity of innocent human life [policy 11]. In 1984 and 1988 this policy position 
included language stating that this applied to “judges at all levels of the judiciary”, but 
since 1992, this phrase has not been included. 
 The 1988 party platform included two new policies, both of which dealt with 
education. First of all, the party platform voiced its opposition to public school-programs 
that were providing birth control, abortion services, or referrals [policy 12]. Secondly, the 
platform voiced its support of abstinence education [policy 13], meaning education aimed 
at convincing teenagers to abstain from sexual activities until they are married. Beginning 
in 2000, Republican Party platforms have included calls for increased funding of 
abstinence education. 
                                                
23
 This policy is generally known as the Mexico City Policy, although its opponents usually refer to it as the 
“global gag rule”.  
24
 Policy 9 is aimed at extending the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection under the law to the 
”unborn.”  
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The 1992 party platform did not introduce any new policies. In 1996, however, 
additional language dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment was introduced. Building on 
the premise underlying policy 9, the platform voiced its support of legislative and judicial 
protection of unborn children’s protection under the Fourteenth Amendment against those 
who perform abortions [policy 14]. The platform also reached out to women by pledging 
to support women with problem pregnancies in a compassionate way [policy 15]. In 
addition to these policies, the 1996 party platform pledged to oppose so-called partial-
birth abortions [policy 16].
25
 
 Similar to the 1992 version, the 2000 party platform did not introduce any new 
policies. In 2004, however, four new policy positions were introduced. The platform 
voiced its support of crisis pregnancy programs [policy 17], parental notification laws 
[policy 18], and health care coverage for unborn children [policy 19]. Lastly, it supported 
the Born Alive Infants Protection Act [policy 20], an act that would ensure that an infant 
born alive, including those who survive an abortion procedure, would be considered a 
person under federal law.  
Summing up, Table 3.9 lists the twenty abortion related policy positions 
introduced in the period between 1976 and 2008, grouped according to the platform 
documents in which they appear. As Table 3.9 clearly shows, there is a piling-on 
tendency with respect to abortion policies over time. Usually, the policies that are 
introduced in one party platform survive and are included in subsequent versions. In a 
few instances, however, policy positions are dropped – which was the case with policy 1 
in 1980, policy 3 and 4 in 1984, and policy 14 and 17 in 2008.  
 The initial “positioning” on the abortion issue – represented by the introduction 
and subsequent exclusion of policy 1 and 4 – seems settled by the abortion plank 
presented in the 1984 platform. This plank has remained untouched up until 2008 – with 
new policies added along the way. However, and as I will demonstrate in the next couple 
of chapters, various presidential candidates have voiced the idea of once again including 
language acknowledging differing views both among Americans and within the 
Republican Party [policy 4]. In the end though, such efforts have not led anywhere. 
                                                
25
 So-called partial-birth abortion is a form of late-term abortions. The medical term is ”intact dilation and 
extraction.” 
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Table 3.9 Abortion related policy positions within Republican Party platforms, 
1976-2008 
PLATFORM YEAR POLICY 
NUMBER 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
1 X         
2 X X
 
   X
A
 X X X X X X 
3 X X        
4  X        
5  X X X X X X X X 
6   X X X X X X X 
7   X X X X X X X 
8   X X X X X X X 
9   X X X X X X X 
10   X X X X X X X 
11   X X   X
B
 X X X X 
12    X X X X X X 
13    X X X   X
C
 X X 
14      X X X  
15      X X X   X
D
 
16      X X X X 
17        X  
18        X X 
19        X X 
20        X X 
Total 3 4 8 10 10 13 13 17 15 
Change  +2, -1 +6, -2 +2  +3  +4 -2 
  (+1) (+5) (+7) (+7) (+10) (+10) (+14) (+12) 
          
POLICY NUMBER:         
1. Continue the public dialogue on abortion.  
2.
A
 Support a constitutional amendment restoring 
protection of the rights to life for unborn children.  
3. Opposing the Supreme Court’s intrusion into the 
family structure by denying parent’s the right and 
obligation to guide their minor children.  
4. Recognizing differing views on abortion, both 
among Americans in general and within the 
Republican Party.  
5. Oppose the use of public revenues for abortion.  
6. Eliminate funding for organizations which 
advocate or support abortion.  
7. Eliminate all U.S. funding for organizations 
which in any way support abortion or research on 
abortion methods.  
8. ”The unborn child has a fundamental individual 
right to life which cannot be infringed”  
9. “The 14th Amendment’s protections apply to 
children” 
10. Support those who provide positive alternatives 
to abortion, including adoption.  
11.
B
 Support the appointment of judges who 
respect traditional family values and the sanctity 
of innocent human life.  
12. Oppose programs in public schools which 
provide birth control, abortion services, or 
referrals.  
13.
C
 Support abstinence education.  
14. Support legislative and judicial protection of 
unborn children’s protection under the 14th 
Amendment against those who perform 
abortions.  
15.
D
 Support women with problem pregnancies 
in a compassionate way.  
16. Oppose partial-birth abortion.  
17. Support crisis pregnancy programs.  
18. Support parental notification laws.  
19. Support health care coverage for unborn 
children.  
20. Support the Born Alive Infants Protection 
Act. 
 
 
Note: A. From 1984: Support of a human life amendment to the Constitution. B. Prior to 1992: judges at all 
levels. From 1992: not specified. C. From 2000: Calls for increased funding of abstinence education. D. In 
2008: change in tone from ”problem pregnancies” to ”the challenges of an unplanned pregnancy.” Source: 
The American Presidency Project (2009a). 
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The “core” within the Republican Party platforms’ positioning on abortion can be 
described as policies that make it over time. Put differently, such a core can be described 
as the party platforms’ “Canon Law” on abortion. Six policies were added to such a core 
of abortion policies in 1984, two more were added in 1988 and 1996,
26
 and three more 
were added in 2004 (although it might be too early to determine whether these are truly 
part of the ”core”). The 2008 party platform is the only platform in which policy 
positions were dropped without the inclusion of new ones (including policy position 14 – 
introduced in 1996 – which appeared to be one of the ”core” abortion policies up until it 
was dropped).  
 Every single one of the Republican Party platforms in the period between 1976 
and 2008 supports a constitutional amendment to ban abortion and thus reverse Roe v. 
Wade. Furthermore, none of the party platforms support abortions in cases of rape or 
incest. Although the platforms do not spell out that abortions are allowed in cases where a 
woman’s life is in jeopardy, there is a common understanding that the right to self-
defense applies. For example, Ronald Reagan argued in a 1984 presidential debate that 
abortion equals the killing of a human being, but that a woman has the right to have an 
abortion if she would die otherwise (The American Presidency Project 1984a). Going 
back to the four-category schema introduced in Chapter 2 – which will be applied on the 
data material in Chapters 4 and 5 – this positioning on abortion can be classified as “Pro-
Life.” 
3.4 Framing 
While the previous section dealt with the specific abortion related policy positions in the 
Republican Party platforms, this section lays out the manner in which the abortion issue 
is framed within the various party platforms. 
 In the 1976 party platform, abortion was framed, for the first and last time, by the 
term “abortion on demand” – hinting to the lack of legal limits on when a woman can 
have an abortion. The 1976 party platform also included the term “right to life”, and this 
term has been included in every single party platform up until 2008. The focus is on the 
                                                
26
 Three policies were added in 1996, but only two of these made into the ”core” of abortion related 
policies. 
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right of “unborn children” – another term used in every single party platform up until 
2008 – to be born.  
 The 1980 party platform did not introduce any new framing of abortion, but the 
1984 version introduced three new frames, in addition to elaborating on the “right to life” 
frame, by adding the words “fundamental individual” in front of, and “which cannot be 
infringed”, after “right to life.” As to the new frames introduced, the platform voiced 
support of “alternatives to abortion”, “traditional family values”, and the “sanctity of 
innocent human life.” Similar to the fate of the abortion related policy positions 
introduced in 1984, the abortion frames introduced in 1984 have been included in every 
single party platform up until 2008. 
 The 1988 party platform introduced one new frame: “abstinence education”, 
while the 1992 party platform did not include any new framing of abortion. The 1996 
party platform introduced three new frames: “problem pregnancies”, “pro-life agenda” 
and “partial-birth abortion.” In 1996 and 2000, “partial-birth abortion” was described as 
“4/5 infanticide.” In 2004, it was described as “brutal and violent” and “inhumane,” while 
it was described as “barbaric” in 2008. The term “pro-life agenda” was not included in 
the 2008 party platform, while the term “problem pregnancies” was substituted by the 
term “unplanned pregnancy” in 2008. 
 The 2000 party platform did not include any new framing of abortion, but the 
2004 party platform introduced eight new frames, and talked about the “Born Alive 
Infants Protection Act”, and described “partial-birth abortion” as a “brutal and violent” 
and “inhumane” procedure. Furthermore, the 2004 party platform talked about the 
“inherent dignity and worth of all people,” “crisis pregnancy”, “parental notification”, 
“defense of life”, and “culture of life.” The 2008 party platform left out five of the frames 
introduced in 2004, but introduced four new abortion frames: “choose life,” “children 
before birth,” “unplanned pregnancy”, in addition to describing “partial-birth abortion” as 
a “barbaric” procedure. 
 Summing up, Table 3.10 lists the twenty-three abortion frames introduced above, 
grouped according to the party platforms in which they appear. 
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Table 3.10 The framing of abortion within Republican Party platforms, 1976-2008   
PLATFORM YEAR ABORTION FRAME 
76 80 84 88 92 96 00 04 08 
Abortion on demand X         
Right to life X X   X
A
 X X X X X X 
Unborn children X X X X X X X X X 
Alternatives to abortion   X X X X X X X 
Traditional family values   X X X X X X X 
Sanctity of innocent human life   X X X X X X   X
B
 
Abstinence education    X X X X X X 
Problem pregnancies      X X X  
Pro-life agenda      X X X  
Partial-birth abortion      X X X X 
    = 4/5 infanticide      X X   
    = Brutal and violent        X  
    = Inhumane        X  
    = Barbaric         X 
Crisis pregnancy        X  
Parental notification        X X 
Born Alive Infants Protection Act        X X 
Inherent dignity and worth of all people       X   X
C
 
Defense of life        X  
Culture of life        X  
Children before birth         X 
Unplanned pregnancy         X 
Choose life         X 
Total 3 2 5 6 6 10 10 17 14 
Change  -1 +3 +1  +4  +8, -1 +4, -7 
   (+2) (+3) (+3) (+7) (+7) (+14) (+11) 
Note: A = From 1984 onwards: “Fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed.” B = 
“Sanctity and dignity of innocent human life”, and “fundamental assault on the sanctity of innocent human 
life” C = “Inherent dignity and sanctity of all human life.” Source: The American Presidency Project 
(2009a). 
 
Discernable from Table 3.10 is a pattern similar to the one apparent in Table 3.9; there is 
a piling-on tendency with respect to abortion frames over time, and there exists a “core” 
among the abortion frames. Among the long-term patterns, perhaps the most prominent 
one is the framing of fetuses as human beings with a right to life.
27
 This point is 
important, since it is the whole basis on which the pro-life movement bases its opposition 
to abortion. Unsurprisingly, and as I will touch upon in the next few chapters, several 
presidential candidates, nominees and presidents have emphasized the importance of this 
distinction, in addition to applying several of the abortion frames listed in Table 3.10. 
                                                
27
 Technically, the term “fetus” applies from the ninth week following fertilization until the birth takes 
place, although abortion opponents might interject that the term ”fetus” is framing as well. 
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Based on the abortion related policy positions and the abortion frames found 
within Republican Party platforms, the next two chapters present narratives of 
Republican presidential candidates’, nominees’, and presidents’ positioning on and 
framing of abortion, in addition to comparing these narratives to the content of Tables 3.9 
and 3.10. 
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Chapter 4 
Republican presidential candidates and nominees on Abortion, 1976-2008 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The object of this chapter is to describe and compare the positioning on and framing of 
abortion among the top five Republican presidential candidates in every Republican 
presidential primary since 1976, based on the abortion related content of Republican 
Party platforms. The chapter goes through the Republican primary elections 
chronologically – and each review focuses first on the candidate finishing last, and ends 
with the one clinching the nomination. The assessments of the candidates’ positioning are 
based on the four-category schema presented in Chapter 2, and the candidates’ framing 
are assessed against the framing found within the party platforms. The chapter ends with 
a short summary of the candidates’ positioning on and framing of abortion. Additional 
analysis and a discussion of the long-term trends are dealt with in Chapter 6. 
4.2 The Nationalization of the abortion issue: The 1976 Republican primaries 
As abortion was legalized in January 1973, 1976 was the first presidential election cycle 
in which the abortion issue made it into the midst of a presidential campaign. President 
Gerald Ford ran as an incumbent in the Republican primaries and was challenged from 
the right by former actor and California Governor Ronald Reagan. As a consequence of 
Reagan’s candidacy, Ford was pushed to the right, and forced to accept several 
conservative measures in the party platform. Ford won in the end, but the prolonged 
primary fight with Reagan probably hurt him in the general election against Jimmy 
Carter, which he lost. 
4.2.1 Governor Ronald Reagan on abortion 
Even before he left the Governor’s office in Sacramento, Reagan had become somewhat 
of a hero for the conservative movement. He campaigned on behalf of conservative 
Republicans all across the country, and he recorded ads spearheading conservative 
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efforts, such as opposing early versions of Medicare.
28
 Reagan launched his bid for the 
1976 Republican nomination against a weakened and unpopular Ford, fueled by the 
pardon he had granted former president Richard Nixon.  
 As Governor, Reagan had signed a liberalized abortion statute into California 
State Law in June 1967. Defending his position, Reagan stated that “a liberalization of 
the abortion laws” was “necessary,” and he signed the law although it did not “meet each 
and every objection” that he had to it (Korman 1967). The law that Reagan signed was 
clearly “Pro-Choice”,
29
 and it replaced language from 1861 that only allowed for 
abortions in order to save the life of the mother. The new law legalized abortions when a 
“pregnancy would gravely impair physical or mental health of the prospective mother, or 
when a girl under 15 becomes pregnant as a result of rape or incest” (Korman 1967).  
 By the time of the 1976 Republican primaries, Reagan had reached a different 
position than the one he held back in 1967. He told journalists that the “liberalized 
abortion bill he signed … led to ‘abortion on demand’ in many of that state’s hospitals,” 
that he “would not make the same ‘mistake’ today,” and that if he could turn back time, 
he “would have [added] more restrictions” than he originally “agreed to” (The New York 
Times 1976). Reagan blamed the increase in the numbers of abortions following the 
introduction of the liberalized abortion statute on “very liberal interpretation by some 
psychiatrists in order to justify abortions that should not have been made” (Rivera 1976). 
 Reagan’s new positioning on abortion was based on the belief “that the 
interruption of a pregnancy is a taking of a human life” (Rosenbaum 1976). In March 
1976, Reagan described the abortion issue as a “nationwide matter” that could only be 
solved by ”a constitutional amendment,” and “that the Human Life Amendment” offered 
“the best opportunity to insure that those not yet born” would “have the right to life” 
(Rivera 1976). In fact, Reagan’s new position on abortion – that abortion should only be 
allowed to save the life of the mother – was identical to the 1861 California abortion 
statute that he repealed in 1967, which also only allowed for abortions in cases where the 
life of the mother was in jeopardy. 
                                                
28
 In a famous speech from 1961, Reagan warned against what he described as “socialized medicine”. You 
can listen to his speech here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpem-AAs  
29
 The term “pro-choice” was not part of the political/journalistic vernacular until the 1970s. 
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 In the ten years leading up to the 1976 Republican primaries, Reagan had gone 
from signing a “Pro-Choice” abortion statute to voicing his support of a solidly “Pro-
Life” amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A key component of Reagan’s strategy in the 
1976 primaries was based on the courting of social conservatives, and the message was 
received among pro-lifers, who rated him “militantly pro-life” (Anstett 1976).  
 As far as framing goes, Reagan did not use any particular frame when talking 
about the abortion issue prior to the 1976 primary. During the primary, however, Reagan 
stated that the California law he had signed into law went further than he had intended, 
and that it effectively led to “abortion on demand.” Later in the primary, Reagan stated 
that “the interruption of a pregnancy is a taking of a human life”, and that the Human Life 
Amendment to the Constitution would “insure that those not yet born will have the right 
to life.”  
4.2.2 President Gerald Ford on abortion 
The striking thing about Gerald Ford’s positioning on abortion
30
 is that it changed with 
the release of the 1976 Republican Party Platform. Prior to its release, Ford’s position 
was “Wishy-Washy” at best, and he stated that Roe v. Wade “went too far” while at the 
same time stating that “the proposals that are made by some for a constitutional 
amendment … are far too restrictive” (The American Presidency Project 1976a). 
However, following the release of the party platform – on the heels of his primary fight 
against Reagan – Ford supported a constitutional amendment banning abortion. When 
confronted with his shifting views on abortion, Ford simply tied himself to the position 
voiced in the party platform, and stated: “I subscribe to the Republican platform. … My 
position is that of the Republican platform, and I will stick with it” (The American 
Presidency Project 1976b). To be clear, Ford’s position was not lock step with the 
platform. Ford stated that he supported a constitutional amendment “that would permit 
the individual States to make the decision” on the legality of abortion, but the 1976 
platform did not describe the details of any such amendment (The American Presidency 
Project 1976b). 
                                                
30
 Unfortunately, the retrieved data material does not cover Gerald Ford’s positioning on abortion prior to 
his ascendance to the presidency in 1974. 
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 Like Reagan, Ford seems to have moved to the right on abortion, but whereas 
Reagan’s change preceded the release of the 1976 party platform, Ford’s change on the 
issue was closely aligned with the release of the platform. Framing wise, the only 
abortion frame used by Ford was “abortion on demand”, a frame he used both prior to, 
and following the release of the 1976 party platform. 
4.3 The GOP drifts further to the right on abortion: The 1980 primaries  
For the first time since 1952, neither Republican presidents nor vice-presidents were 
seeking the Republican nomination in 1980. In addition to Ronald Reagan, former Texas 
Congressman and former head of CIA George Bush, Representative John Anderson of 
Illinois, Representative Phil Crane of Texas, and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker 
of Tennessee all ran for the Republican nomination. 
4.3.1 Phil Crane and Howard Baker on abortion 
The only source available for the positioning of Representative Phil Crane includes a 
direct quote stating his opposition to abortion:  
 
Personally, I’m totally opposed to it – with exceptions, such as saving the life of the 
mother. I’ve supported the right to life amendment. An easier way to address that 
problem, though, is simply to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction and put it back on the 
shoulders of the states (Terry 1979). 
 
Crane’s support of the right to life amendment puts him on the pro-life side of the fence. 
However, the quote also includes several somewhat “Wishy-Washy” positions, such as 
framing his position by the word “personally”, and by stating that the issue should be 
turned over to the sates, which implicitly means that he would not object if a state 
decided to legalize abortion. 
 The news search only returned two hits dealing with Senator Howard Baker’s 
positioning on abortion, and none of them included any direct quotes. However, the 
content of the news articles paint him as a supporter of a “Pro-Choice” position on 
abortion. Anstett (1976) writes that the National Right to Life Committee distributed 
information during the 1976 election cycle stating that Baker, among others, “are 
unsuitable to them for the vice presidential nomination because of their pro-abortion 
stands.” Furthermore, a Newsweek article states that Baker was the subject of a bitter 
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campaign waged by “conservative ideologues … for his readiness to compromise” 
(Morgenthau et al. 1980). 
 Sadly, the empirical material is too thin to place Crane and Baker in any specific 
category, but Crane appears to have been somewhere between the “Wishy-Washy” and 
the “Pro-Life with exceptions” category, while Baker appears to have been “Pro-Choice.” 
4.3.2 Mr. Independent: John Anderson on abortion 
Congressman John Anderson’s “Pro-Choice” positioning on and framing of abortion was 
briefly mentioned in the Prelude. His “Pro-Choice” positioning was consistent throughout 
the primaries, and he based his position on a belief in the “freedom of choice” (Axelrod 
& Ciccone 1980). According to The New York Times (1980a), Anderson “argued for 
Federally funded abortions” during his 1978 Congressional reelection campaign. 
Although Anderson ran as a Republican, he bowed out of the primaries after dismal 
results on April 24, 1980, and ran as an Independent. After his decision to run as an 
Independent, The National Right to Life Committee attacked Anderson on the grounds 
that he had written “fund-raising letters for pro-abortion groups” (The New York Times 
1980b), and Anderson criticized the Republican Party platform “for its support of a 
constitutional amendment banning abortion” (The New York Times 1980c). Furthermore, 
Anderson attacked the Republican platform by stating: “I can’t believe it is pro-family 
when the Government forces a 13-year-old to bear a child” (The New York Times 1980c).  
In his presidential debate against Ronald Reagan on September 21, 1980, 
Anderson described his support of abortion rights by stating: “I believe in freedom of 
choice. I don't believe in Constitutional Amendments that would interfere with that” (The 
American Presidency Project 1980). Anderson’s positioning on and framing of abortion 
was consistently “Pro-Choice” both as a Republican and as an Independent candidate, 
and he positioned himself by using the terms “freedom of choice” and “pro-choice.”  
4.3.3 George Bush on abortion  
Unfortunately, the news search did not return any direct quotes from Bush on abortion 
during the 1980 primaries. However, accounts from both the Chicago Tribune and The 
New York Times allude to his somewhat “Wishy-Washy” positioning on abortion. 
Margolis (1979) writes that “Bush opposes abortions but stops short of favoring a 
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constitutional amendment to ban them”, while The New York Times (1980b) writes that 
Bush’s candidacy was opposed by the National Right to Life Committee due to the fact 
that he was “against a constitutional amendment barring abortion.” 
 Although the news search did not reveal it, it is a well-known fact that Bush ran 
as a pro-choice Republican in the 1980 primaries, and that he famously shifted his 
position on abortion once he became Reagan’s vice-presidential nominee.
31
 While the 
news search did not pick up these events in the time period covering Bush’s 1980 bid for 
the presidency, his shift on abortion becomes apparent in section 4.4.4, when I deal with 
his second bid for the presidency. 
4.3.4 Ronald Reagan on abortion Part II 
Reagan’s position on abortion was identical to the one he voiced in 1976: He supported a 
Human Life Amendment to the U.S. Constitution – calling for a federal ban of abortion. 
Tellingly, the National Right to Life Committee endorsed Reagan for president, and the 
president of the organization stated: “Governor Reagan has taken the strongest pro-life 
stand of any of the candidates running for President” (The New York Times 1980b). In his 
debate against the then Independent John Anderson on September 21, 1980, Reagan 
declared he thought everyone “should have a respect for innocent life,” and that “an 
unborn child” is in fact “a human being” (The American Presidency Project 1980). 
Framing wise, Reagan used the terms “innocent life” and “unborn child.” 
4.4 Reagan has left the building: The 1988 primaries 
Reagan left the White House as an exceptionally popular figure within the Republican 
Party, and his successor had a tough act to follow (no pun intended). George Bush, 
Reagan’s vice-president and opponent in the 1980 primaries, was the Republican front-
runner for the 1988 Republican nomination. The Minority Leader in the Senate, Bob 
Dole, televangelist and Christian Coalition-founder Pat Robertson, and Representative 
Jack Kemp of New York challenged Bush for the Republican nomination. 
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 Based on the research strategy, the candidates are assessed according to the information retrieved from 
the news searches. However, in the case of Bush’s first run for the presidency, I have alluded to a well-
known historical account. See Schaller (2007:61) and Hudson (2008:242-244) for more information on 
Bush’s shift on abortion. 
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4.4.1 The former quarterback: Jack Kemp on abortion 
Known to the average American as a gifted football player in his youth, New York 
Congressman Jack Kemp ran as a pro-life Republican in the 1988 primaries, and 
described his own position by stating that he was “’100 percent pro-life’ and that he 
would work to ‘protect the unborn’ by appointing judges ‘who uphold our Judeo-
Christian values and continuing to seek constitutional protection for human life’” (Dowd 
1987). Back in 1985, Representative Kemp and Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah offered 
identical amendments stating that no “federal funding could be used for abortion 
counseling or referrals” and that no federal money “could go to a group, clinic or hospital 
that performed abortions with its own funds” (Goodman 1985). In the same article, 
Goodman (1985) writes that this was  “the first time that Kemp” took “such a lead role on 
a conservative ‘social issue’,” and that he appeared “to be priming his right wing for the 
flight of 1988.” 
 Kemp’s “Pro-Life” positioning on abortion was consistent both prior to and 
throughout the 1988 Republican primaries, and he spoke at the 1986 convention of the 
National Right to Life Committee together with Republican primary opponents Senator 
Bob Dole and Reverend Pat Robertson (Coates 1986). In his speech, Kemp appealed for 
“not just a change of law but a change of heart” on abortion, and was met with “ovations 
that surpassed the reception given Robertson” (Time Magazine 1986). In the end, Kemp 
nonetheless finished last in the primaries, behind Robertson, Dole and Bush. 
4.4.2 The Televangelist: Pat Robertson on abortion 
In 1988, Reverend Pat Robertson was one of the most popular television evangelists in 
the United States, and his route to the nomination hinged on receiving the support of a 
large share of his viewers. Similar to Kemp, part of Robertson’s appeal to the base of the 
Republican Party rested on his conservative stance on social issues such as abortion. 
However, Robertson’s approach to abortion was slightly more combative than that of 
Kemp, evidenced by the following quote: “Just as these people are saying we can never 
allow private choice to become the rationale for killing the elderly and the infirm, we can 
no longer permit pro-choice to be the rationale for the slaughter of 1 ! million unborn 
babies every year” (Smith 1987). In a similar tone, Robertson stated to a group of 
supporters in February 1986 that the fact that the United States was “offering up 1 ! 
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million babies a year upon the altar of sensuality and selfishness” would have to stop 
(Ostling et al. 1986). 
 In the end, Robertson’s “Pro-Life” positioning on and framing of abortion was 
consistent both prior to and during the Republican primaries, and he finished ahead of 
Jack Kemp, but behind Bob Dole and George Bush, winning a total of only four states. 
4.4.3 Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole on abortion 
Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, who was Gerald Ford’s vice-presidential running mate 
in 1976, approached the abortion issue much as Jack Kemp did: Never as a favorite issue, 
but always “Pro-Life.” Back in 1981, Dole received a nod of acknowledgement from the 
president of the National Right to Life Committee (Greenhouse 1981), and in 1986 he 
was asked the following question; “Why are you going out there to pander to the right-to-
lifers?” Dole’s response: “It’s a little late for that. I’ve been voting with them for 13 
years!” (Press et al. 1986). 
 Furthermore, Dole stated in December 1987 that he had “a very strong pro-life 
voting record” that had “been consistent,” and that he viewed it as “a fundamental issue, 
a basic issue. People feel strongly about it. So do I” (Weinraub 1987). In short, Dole’s 
positioning on abortion was consistently “Pro-Life” both prior to and during the 1988 
Republican primaries. Framing wise, he used the terms “pro-life”, “right to life” and 
“unborn” when describing his own positioning on abortion.  
4.4.4 Vice-president George Bush on abortion 
As previously mentioned, George Bush repositioned himself on abortion following the 
1980 Republican primaries, when he ran as Reagan’s vice-presidential nominee. As 
Reagan’s vice-president, Bush’s positioning was clearly opposed to abortion, but it was 
not as conservative as Reagan’s positioning. From the fall of 1980, Bush favored 
abortions in cases of rape, incest and to save the life of the mother. Reagan, however, 
only favored abortions in cases where women would die during childbirth (The New York 
Times 1984). 
 However, by the time of the 1988 Republican primaries, Bush had taken yet 
another step to the right on abortion, and after he secured the Republican presidential 
nomination, Bush ran on essentially the same abortion plank as Ronald Reagan had done 
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in 1984 (see Chapter 3). In his nomination speech at the Republican National Convention 
in New Orleans, Bush declared:  
 
Is it right to believe in the sanctity of life and protect the lives of innocent 
children? My opponent says no - but I say yes. We must change from abortion - to 
adoption. I have an adopted granddaughter. The day of her christening we wept 
with joy. I thank God her parents chose life (The American Presidency Project 
1988a). 
 
In his debate against the Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis, Bush admitted to his 
changing view on abortion, stating: “Yes, my position has evolved. And it's continuing to 
evolve, and it's evolving in favor of life” (The American Presidency Project 1988b). As a 
1980 presidential candidate, Bush was “Pro-Choice.” As a vice-presidential nominee and 
as vice-president Bush was “Pro-Life with exceptions”, and as a 1988 presidential 
candidate and nominee, Bush was “Pro-Life”, and in line with the Republican Party 
platform on abortion. Framing wise, Bush used the term “sanctity of life.” 
4.5 The incumbent and the challenger from the right: The 1992 primaries 
Pat Buchanan, President Reagan’s former communications director, challenged President 
George Bush from the right in the 1992 Republican primaries. 
4.5.1 The challenger from the right: Pat Buchanan on abortion 
Unlike Bush’s various positions on the abortion issue, Buchanan had no previous history 
of wavering on the issue, and he was consistently “Pro-Life” both prior to and during the 
1992 primaries. Describing himself as an “anti-abortion candidate” (Madigan 1992), 
Buchanan insisted that the Republican Party “should be pro-life”, even if that would lose 
the party votes (Lacayo 1992). Buchanan wanted the pro-life movement to know that he 
put his anti-abortion principles over the prospects of electoral victory. That made him a 
favorable candidate among ardent abortion opponents, but cast doubts on his ability to 
topple Bush and a Democratic opponent outside the hardest segments of the Republican 
base. In the end, Bush won all 50 states, but Buchanan’s candidacy, including his 
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infamous speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention,
32
 made it harder for Bush 
to appeal to moderates in the general election. Framing wise, Buchanan used the term 
“pro-life.” 
4.5.2 The incumbent: President George Bush on abortion 
As previously mentioned, Bush moved further to the right on abortion prior to the 1988 
Republican primaries. In 1992, Bush was getting close the end of his first term as 
president, and he had addressed the abortion issue several times as president. He was in 
line with the 1988 and the 1992 party platform while in office, and he referred to the 
abortion issue by using the terms “unborn children”, “abortion on demand”, “sanctity of 
human life”, “pro-life” and “right to life”, just to mention a few. I will deal with President 
Bush’s positioning on and framing of abortion more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
Suffice to say, Bush’s positioning on and framing of abortion was close to that of the 
abortion plank within the Republican Party platform. 
4.6 An Open Field of Presidential Hopefuls: The 1996 primaries 
For the first time since 1980, there was not a clear front-runner in the field of Republican 
presidential candidates in 1996. The former Minority and the present Majority Leader 
Bob Dole ran for the second time, and so did Pat Buchanan, and they ran against 
publisher Steve Forbes, the former Governor of Tennessee and Secretary of Education 
under President George Bush, Lamar Alexander, and radio talk show host Alan Keyes. 
4.6.1 Firebrand: Alan Keyes on abortion 
Keyes’ conservative stance on abortion was central to his bid for the 1996 Republican 
presidential nomination. During the early days of the primaries, Keyes talked about the 
pro-choice positioning on abortion in the following terms:  
 
Their pro-choice position is based on the notion that a woman has a choice. If she wants 
the baby, then it’s human and she has to respect its life. And if she doesn’t want it, it’s 
not human and she doesn’t have to respect it. We are placing that human choice in the 
                                                
32
 During his speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention, Buchanan stated: “There is a religious 
war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we 
will one day be as was the Cold War itself” (Buchanan 1992). 
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place of God’s exercising authority in such a way as to cut the ground out from under our 
claim to be free (Kolbert 1995). 
 
Unfortunately, the news searches did not retrieve any abortion frames used by Keyes, but 
all the news reports in the time leading up to and during the 1996 primaries describe his 
firm “Pro-Life” positioning on the issue. In the end, Keyes finished fifth in the primaries. 
4.6.2 Mr. Plaid Shirt: Lamar Alexander on Abortion 
The former Governor of Tennessee was known for the plaid shirts he frequently used. On 
abortion, Lamar Alexander frequently described his own position by the term “pro-life,” 
although his actual positioning on the issue was sometimes “Pro-Choice”, mostly 
“Wishy-Washy”, and only occasionally “Pro-Life”. News reports from 1994 and 1995 
paint him as pro-choice, but he drifted rightwards sometime in 1995, evidenced by the 
endorsement he received from the Christian Coalition based on his comment that Roe v. 
Wade was “wrongly decided” (Goodgame & Baker 1995). At the same time, however, 
Alexander described his position on abortion with statements such as the following: “I 
would try to keep the Federal Government entirely out of abortion: no subsidy, no 
encouragement, no prohibition” (Carlson 1995). 
 The “no prohibition” comment puts him squarely in the “Pro-Choice” category, 
but Alexander skillfully sent out mixed messages by stating he wanted the decision left 
entirely to the states (Nagourney 1996), and that he would permit abortions in cases of 
rape (Seelye 1996). Wishy-washiness aside, Alexander stuck to framing his position on 
abortion with the term “pro-life”, and ended on fourth place in the primaries. 
4.6.3 The publisher: Steve Forbes on abortion 
The multimillionaire publisher Steve Forbes ran as a Republican in the 1996 primaries. 
He focused most of his message and attention on what he called the “flat tax”, but due to 
the dynamics of Republican presidential primaries, Forbes also had to elaborate his 
position on abortion. 
 Forbes’ positioning on abortion in the 1996 primaries was as “Wishy-Washy” as 
that of Lamar Alexander. Describing his position in September 1995, Forbes would not 
reveal whether he was pro-choice or pro-life, but stated that he wanted “to create an 
environment where abortion” would “disappear” (McNulty & Orr 1995). Later in the 
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primaries, Forbes added that the country needed “a change of heart” (Kolbert 1996), and 
that a constitutional amendment banning abortion was unlikely because a change in the 
law would only occur following a change in the “culture, little by little. It takes 
persuading other people. There is no other way in a democracy” (Gibbs et al. 1996). 
 The news searches did not retrieve any abortion frames used by Forbes in the time 
leading up to or during the 1996 primaries. His positioning, however, was sometimes 
“Pro-Choice”, and mostly “Wishy-Washy” – unwilling to pin down his own position, 
focusing instead on the need to change the culture in order to change the law on the 
matter. Forbes won two states, and finished ahead of both Alexander and Keyes, and 
behind Buchanan and Dole. 
4.6.4 Pat Buchanan on abortion Part II 
Emboldened by his 1992 bid for the presidency, Pat Buchanan ran again in 1996. In 
1993, Buchanan described his own positioning on abortion and stressed the importance of 
the Republican Party sticking to its pro-life message: “If a political party would turn its 
back on the 4,000 unborn children doomed to death every day in this country, then it is 
time to find a new party. We are a pro-life party, and we are going to keep our party pro-
life” (The New York Times 1993). In 1995, Buchanan gave the following promise to the 
pro-life movement: “If I am elected to the Oval Office, I will be the most pro-life 
president in the history of the republic” (Chicago Tribune 1995). 
 Framing wise, Buchanan used the following terms to describe his positioning on 
abortion: “pro-life”, “unborn children”, “right to life”, “culture of death” and “the 
innocent unborn.” Among the 1996 contenders for the Republican nomination, Buchanan 
was the most outspoken abortion opponent. In the end, Buchanan won four states, and 
ended behind Dole in the race to the nomination. 
4.6.5 Bob Dole on abortion Part II 
Serving as the Senate Majority Leader and running for his second time, Bob Dole was 
considered as somewhat of a front-runner in 1996. His position on abortion was similar to 
the one he ran on in 1988, and in April 1995, Dole stated that his positioning had been 
“consistently pro-life” (Berke 1995). Furthermore, Dole had a “100 percent rating on his 
lifetime voting record from the National Right to Life Committee” (McNulty 1995). 
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However, several of Dole’s statements on abortion during the 1996 primaries put him at 
odds with the Republican Party platform’s position on abortion. On the issue of a 
constitutional ban on abortion, he stated that he would not support it again, and hinted 
that he might choose a pro-choice running mate (Seelye 1995). A few days after these 
statements, Dole backpedaled, and claimed that he meant to say that he would oppose a 
ban on abortion if it did not include exceptions for rape and incest (The New York Times 
1995). The party platform did not include these exceptions, and later in the campaign, 
Dole also emphasized the need to include a “declaration of tolerance” in the party 
platform “welcoming those who favor abortion rights” (Chicago Tribune 1996). In the 
end, the 1996 Republican Party Platform on which Dole based his general election 
campaign did not include exceptions for rape and incest, or a ‘declaration of tolerance’.  
On the one hand, Dole’s various statements did not push away pro-lifers – who 
still believed he was one of them – and on the other hand, they led pro-choicers to believe 
that he was not a conservative hardliner on the issue. Framing wise, Dole used the 
following terms when addressing the abortion issue: “pro-life”, “parental notification”, 
“sanctity of human life”, “partial-birth abortion”, infanticide”, and “abortion on demand.” 
Dole ended up winning 44 states in the primaries, but suffered a bruising defeat against 
Bill Clinton in the general election. 
4.7 An Open Field of Presidential Hopefuls Part II: The 2000 primaries 
Similarly to 1980 and 1996, no presidents or vice-presidents ran for the 2000 Republican 
presidential nomination. Forbes and Keyes ran again, and they were challenged by Texas 
Governor George W. Bush and Arizona Senator John McCain. 
4.7.1 Steve Forbes and Alan Keyes for the second time around 
The 1996 version of Steve Forbes was “Wishy-Washy” on abortion. The second time 
around, however, Forbes campaigned on a different strategy, focusing more on his social 
conservatism than on his advocacy of a “flat tax”. Already in September 1997, Forbes 
stated that “life begins at conception” in a speech to the Christian Coalition’s ‘Road to 
Victory’ conference (Chicago Tribune 1997). However, Forbes was still unwilling to 
support or oppose a constitutional amendment on abortion, focusing instead on his 
opposition to partial-birth abortions (Berke 1997), and talking about every child’s 
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“freedom to be born” (Berke 1999). While Forbes had been unwilling to describe himself 
as either pro-choice or pro-life in 1996, he frequently attacked George W. Bush for being 
a “pro-life pacifist” during the 2000 primaries. Furthermore, Forbes ran the following ad 
on television: “If someone kills a pet, it’s called a crime. If someone aborts a child, it’s 
called a choice” (Bruni & Wayne 2000). Framing wise, Forbes used the terms “partial-
birth abortion” and “pro-life”, and cast himself as an ardent abortion opponent. However, 
due to his unwillingness to support a federal ban on abortion – even one including a range 
of exceptions – Forbes’ positioning was still “Wishy-Washy.” 
 Alan Keyes was the most outspoken abortion opponent among the Republican 
candidates in 2000. He shouted, “stop killing the babies” to a crowd in 1997 (Chicago 
Tribune 1997), and he lambasted his opponents for not being conservative enough on 
abortion during several primary debates (Anderson & Pearson 2000). Framing wise, 
Keyes used the terms “pro-life” and “pro-abortion.” 
4.7.2 The “straight-talk express”: John McCain on abortion 
The Vietnam War veteran John McCain ran on his “maverick” image in 2000 and 
became a favorite among reporters due to the unprecedented access they were granted on 
his “straight talk express”-campaign bus. On the campaign trail, the Arizona Senator’s 
“17-year pro-life voting record” was a favorite talking point (Marks 2000), and McCain 
stated during the primaries that he was “pro-life” and that he supported the party line on 
abortion based on “the belief that life begins at conception” (Clymer & Mitchell 2000). 
 However, the news search revealed several cracks in McCain’s “Pro-Life” 
positioning. First of all, he answered a hypothetical question about what he would say if 
his teenage daughter became pregnant by stating that she would have the “final decision,” 
backpedaling days later by stating that it would be a “family decision” (Mitchell 2000). 
Secondly, in August 1999, McCain stated the following:  
 
I’d love to see a point where [Roe v. Wade] is irrelevant and could be repealed because 
abortion is no longer necessary. But certainly in the short term, or even the long term, I 
would not support a repeal of Roe v. Wade, which would then force x number of women 
in America to [undergo] illegal and dangerous operations (Pooley et al. 2000). 
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Then, in December 1999, McCain called the Roe v. Wade decision “overreaching” and 
“flawed,” and stated that exceptions for rape, incest and danger to the life of the mother 
should be included in the party’s abortion plank (Pooley et al. 2000). With this belief as a 
backdrop, McCain attacked George W. Bush during a primary debate – holding up a flyer 
distributed by the Bush campaign touting Bush’s support of the party line on abortion. 
McCain then asked Bush if he supported abortion in cases of rape, incest and to save the 
life of the mother, and Bush answered that he did. McCain then stated that Bush’s flyer 
was misleading since these exceptions were not included in the party platform. The 
heated exchange that followed boiled down to the following: McCain supported a 
revision of the party platform so that it would include exceptions for rape and incest, 
while Bush tried to have it both ways by stating that he agreed with McCain, while at the 
same time pledging to uphold the party platform (The New York Times 2000). Despite 
McCain’s sometimes “Wishy-Washy” statements on abortion, his framing was not, 
evidenced by his use of the terms “sanctity of human life”, “pro-life” and “unborn.” In 
the end, Bush beat McCain, who only won seven states in the Republican primaries. 
4.7.3 In his father’s footsteps: George W. Bush on abortion 
Texas Governor George W. Bush’s positioning on abortion during the 2000 primaries 
was somewhere between the “Pro-Life with exceptions” and the “Pro-Life” category. 
However, Bush’s previous history on abortion was somewhat “Wishy-Washy.” In 1998, 
Bush described himself as personally “pro-life”, but added that he considered a woman’s 
right to choose as settled law:  
 
The United States Supreme Court has settled the abortion issue: there will be abortions in 
Texas and the rest of the United States. I believe the best public policy is to encourage 
fewer abortions through strong adoption laws and by sending a clear abstinence message 
to our children (Verhoek 1998). 
 
The wishy-washiness endured after Bush unveiled his exploratory committee, being 
unwilling to answer questions about his stance on the Republican Party’s anti-abortion 
plank and on whether or not abortions should be legal in the first trimester (Tackett 
1999). During the spring of 1999, Bush’s talking points on abortion was in line with the 
“Pro-Life with exceptions” category, and he was thus at odds with the party platforms’ 
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abortion plank. Then, in January 2000, Bush stated the following: “I think that the 
Republican Party ought to keep its pro-life plank the way it’s written now” (Bruni 
2000).
33
 In his nomination speech at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia, 
Bush declared: “I will lead our nation toward a culture that values life -- the life of the 
elderly and the sick, the life of the young, and the life of the unborn” (The American 
Presidency Project 2000).  
In short, Bush went from stating that “the country is not ready for a constitutional 
amendment” in November 1999, to voicing his strong support for the party platform’s 
language on abortion in January 2000 (Pooley et. al 2000). Framing wise, Bush used the 
following terms: “pro-life”, “parental notification”, “parental consent”, “abstinence 
programs”, “partial-birth abortion”, “unborn” and “culture of life.” Bush won the 
Republican nomination, and went on to serve two terms as president, which I will deal 
with in detail in the next chapter. 
4.8 An Open Field of Presidential Hopefuls Part III: The 2008 primaries 
Since George W. Bush’s vice-president Dick Cheney decided not to run for the 2008 
Republican nomination, the Republican Party lacked a clear front-runner. Arizona 
Senator John McCain ran for the second time, and he ran against former Arkansas 
Governor Mike Huckabee, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, Representative 
Ron Paul of Texas, and the actor and former Tennessee Senator Fred Thompson. 
4.8.1 The “Consistent Conservative”: Fred Thompson on abortion 
Fred Thompson had the advantage of high name recognition due to his role in the popular 
television series Law and Order, but his campaign was dogged by the fact that he entered 
the primaries late, and by the low intensity of his lackluster campaign. Thompson 
described himself as a “consistent conservative” in television ads, and his “100 percent 
voting record on the pro-life issues” was a favorite talking point on the campaign trail 
(Hulse et al. 2007). A closer scrutiny of Thompson’s positioning on abortion reveals that 
he was “Pro-Choice” during his 1994 Senate run. In 1994, Thompson stated that he 
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 Intriguingly, Bush’s repositioning was voiced on the day of the 2000 March for Life – the nation’s 
biggest pro-life march since its introduction in January 1974, commemorating the anniversary of Roe v. 
Wade (1973). I have written shortly about my own experiences at the 2002 March for Life at the outset of 
this thesis. 
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opposed criminalizing abortion, and he checked “’opposed’ to a proposed constitutional 
amendment protecting the sanctity of human life” in a 1996 Christian Coalition 
questionnaire (Bailey & Conant 2007). During his nine years in the Senate, however, 
Thompson was consistently “Pro-Life.” Framing wise, Thompson used the terms “pro-
life” and “partial-birth abortion”, and bowed out of the primaries early following dismal 
results. 
4.8.2 The Internet sensation: Ron Paul on abortion 
Texas Congressman Ron Paul built his 2008 presidential bid on an impressive online 
fundraising effort, and the unconventional candidate surprised the political establishment 
with his long-lived campaign. Unfortunately, the news search did not retrieve any 
abortion frames used by Paul, but the retrieved articles allude to his positioning. In 
November 2007, Paul stated that “states, not the federal government, should deal with 
issues such as abortion” (Anderson 2007), and an article from January 2008 states that 
Paul sponsored a bill in the House of Representatives that would bar federal courts from 
interfering with state abortion laws (Chicago Tribune 2008). 
 Paul did not emphasize his position on abortion during the 2008 primaries, and his 
position was at odds with the Republican Party platform, which supports a (federal) 
constitutional amendment banning abortion. Sadly, the empirical material is too thin to 
place Paul in any specific category, but his position seems grounded in the importance of 
protecting states’ rights, and not in a fundamental opposition to abortion per se.  
4.8.3 “Reagan did it too”: Mitt Romney on abortion 
In his failed run for the Senate in 1994, Mitt Romney stated that abortions should be 
“safe and legal” (Belluck et al. 2005), and he defended his positioning with a personal 
story:  
 
Many, many years ago, I had a dear, close family relative that was very close to me, that 
passed away from an illegal abortion. It is since that time my mother and my family have 
been committed to the belief that we can believe as we want, but we will not force our 
beliefs on others on that matter, and you will not see me wavering on that (Pearson 2007). 
 
Romney’s position was the same during his successful campaign for Governor of 
Massachusetts in 2002, when he answered “yes” on a question on whether or not he 
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supported the essence of Roe v. Wade (Belluck et al. 2005). Up until 2005, Romney’s 
position on abortion was “Pro-Choice”, but he changed his position in 2005, when he 
came to the realization that Roe v. Wade had devalued respect for life (Chapman 2006). 
Still, Romney’s position was not entirely in line with the Republican Party platform as he 
favored abortions in cases of rape and incest. 
 During the 2008 primaries, Romney’s opponents painted him as a flip-flopper. 
Romney responded by admitting that he had previously worn a pro-choice cloak as a 
politician, but that he had always been pro-life personally. He defended bringing his pro-
life views into the public domain by pointing to Ronald Reagan’s evolving positioning on 
abortion: “On abortion I was not always a Ronald Reagan conservative. Neither was 
Ronald Reagan” (Healy 2007). Romney’s positioning can be categorized as “Pro-Life 
with exceptions”, and he used the term “pro-life” to describe his current position, and 
“pro-choice” to describe his previous position. In the end, Romney spent more money 
than any of the other candidates, and ended up winning eleven primaries – three more 
than Mike Huckabee – but he still ended on third place due to a lower delegate count than 
Huckabee.  
4.8.4 The Pastor from Hope, Arkansas: Mike Huckabee on abortion 
The former Governor of Arkansas was virtually unknown nationally when he announced 
his candidacy, but he changed that with the release of a campaign ad in which the actor 
Chuck Norris appeared. Huckabee’s appeal to the voters rested on a strategy based on his 
social conservative credentials balanced with a large dose of humor and folksy charm. 
The voters of Iowa liked him, and Huckabee scored a surprising victory in the Iowa 
caucuses. Describing his positioning on abortion on the Sunday talk show Meet the Press, 
Huckabee stated that he would always “err on the side of life” and that life “begins at 
conception”, but that it does not “end at birth” (Toner 2007). In a similar vein, Huckabee 
stated during the primaries that respect for life was the most important moral issue facing 
the country (Parsons & McCormick 2007), and attacked Romney’s wavering on the issue 
by uttering his amazement “at the number of people who come to the conclusion to be 
pro-life when it comes time to run for president” (Nagourney et al. 2007). 
 Framing wise, Huckabee used the terms “pro-life” and “the sanctity of human 
life”, and his positioning was consistently “Pro-Life” both prior to and during the 2008 
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primaries. Huckabee won eight states – with a higher delegate count than Romney – and 
was John McCain’s hardest competitor for the Republican nomination. 
4.8.5 Shifting gears: John McCain on abortion Part II 
McCain stated in 2007 that his position on right to life had been “consistent”, and that he 
had not changed his position “on even-numbered years or … because of the different 
offices” that he might be running for (Nagourney & Santora 2007). As late as in May 
2008, McCain reiterated his belief that abortions should be legal in cases of rape, incest 
and to save the life of the mother, and that he favored including these exceptions in the 
party platform. McCain had been outspoken on this matter in the 2000 primaries, more so 
than he was in 2008, and although he stated in May 2008 that he would work to include 
these exceptions in the party platform, “McCain in fact did little to push for the 
exceptions, and told Glamour on July 30 that he had ‘not gotten into the platform 
discussions’” (Seelye 2008). 
In the last of the three presidential debates against his Democratic opponent 
Senator Barack Obama, McCain declared the following: “We have to change the culture 
of America. Those of us who are proudly pro-life understand that” (The American 
Presidency Project 2008). Although McCain campaigned on a positioning on abortion 
equal to that of the “Pro-Life with exceptions” category both in the 2000 and the 2008 
primaries, he ended up running on an abortion plank without such exceptions in the 
general election. Framing wise, McCain used the terms “pro-life”, “partial-birth 
abortion”, “unborn”, and “right to life” to describe his own positioning on abortion. 
4.9 A short summary of positioning and framing 
In order to provide an overview of the candidates’ and nominees’ positioning on abortion 
in the period covered by the news searches,
34
 I have summarized the essence of the 
chapter’s review in Table 4.1. 
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 The searches stretch back ten years from Election Day in the candidate’s first presidential election. When 
running for the second time, the searches cover the period between Election Day and back to the day 
following Election Day in the previous election cycle. 
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Table 4.1 Presidential candidates’ and nominees’ positioning on abortion 
 Pro-
Choice 
Wishy-
Washy 
Pro-Life w/ 
exceptions 
Pro-
Life 
Consistent 
positioning 
Grew more 
conservative 
Reagan    X X  
Ford    X  X 
Anderson X    X  
Bush Sr.    X  X 
Kemp    X X  
Robertson    X X  
Dole    X X  
Buchanan    X X  
Keyes    X X  
Alexander  X    X 
Forbes  X    X 
McCain    X  X 
Bush Jr.    X  X 
Thompson    X  X 
Romney   X   X 
Huckabee    X X  
Totals 1 2 1 12 8 8 
Note: I have coded the candidates’ positioning into the four-category schema based on the position they ran 
on most recently. Candidates who drifted in the direction of the “Pro-Life” category are labeled as “grew 
more conservative.” Reagan drifted rightwards on abortion prior to the release of the 1976 Republican 
Party Platform, and is therefore labeled with a “consistent positioning.” The retrieved material on Crane, 
Baker and Paul was not large enough to place them in any of the categories.  
 
As Table 4.1 shows, the sixteen
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 Republican presidential candidates covered in this 
chapter can be split into two large groups: eight in the group of candidates who grew 
more conservative in their positioning on abortion, and eight in the group of candidates 
whose positioning on abortion was consistent in the period covered by the news searches. 
Furthermore, Table 4.1 shows that none of the candidates grew more liberal on abortion, 
and that a clear majority of them (12) were or ended up as “Pro-Life”, and in support of 
the Republican Party’s anti-abortion plank. 
 Framing wise, Table 4.2 compares the candidates’ framing of abortion with the 
abortion frames used in the Republican Party platforms. The table demonstrates that the 
presidential candidates vary greatly in their framing of abortion, and that the most 
commonly used abortion frame is “pro-life”, followed by “unborn” and “right to life.” 
Furthermore, the numbers in the last column in Table 4.2 show the number of abortion 
frames used by the various candidates and nominees, and these numbers allude to 
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 The thesis covers nineteen candidates, but the news searches did not retrieve a sufficient amount of news 
articles on Crane, Baker and Paul. 
  
Table 4.2 Presidential candidates’ and nominees’ framing of abortion 
 
 Abortion 
on 
demand 
Right 
to life 
Unborn 
* 
Alternatives 
to abortion 
Sanctity of 
(innocent) 
human life 
Abstinence 
education 
Pro-
Life 
** 
Partial-
birth 
abortion 
4/5 
infanticide 
***  
Parental 
notification 
Culture 
of life 
Totals 
Reagan X X X         3 
Ford X           1 
Crane  X          1 
Bush Sr.     X       1 
Kemp   X    X     2 
Robertson   X         1 
Dole X X X  X  X X X X  8 
Buchanan  X X    X     3 
Keyes       X     1 
Alexander       X     1 
Forbes       X X    2 
McCain  X X  X  X X    5 
Bush Jr.   X X  X X X  X X 7 
Thompson       X X    2 
Romney       X     1 
Huckabee     X  X     2 
Totals 3 5 7 1 4 1 11 5 1 2 1  
Note: The table compares the framing of abortion used in the party platforms with that of the candidates. Source: The American Presidency Project (2009a). 
* The party platform talks about “unborn children”, but most candidates left out the word “children”  
** The party platform talks about a “pro-life agenda”, but the candidates left out the word “agenda” 
*** Used to described the practice of “partial-birth abortion” 
The news searches did not pick up any abortion frames used by Baker, Anderson or Paul.  
 
The following abortion frames were not used by any of the candidates: “Traditional family values”, “problem pregnancies”, (partial-birth abortion =) “brutal and 
violent” and “inhumane” and “barbaric”, “crisis pregnancy”, “born alive infants”, “inherent dignity and worth of all people”, “defense of life”, “children before 
birth”, “unplanned pregnancy”, “choose life.”
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the varying degree to which the candidates emphasized the abortion issue. According to 
this logic, the abortion issue was more important to Bob Dole and George W. Bush than 
it was to Mitt Romney and Lamar Alexander. Table 4.2 also alludes to the recurring 
theme of increased emphasis on abortion over time: Whereas the nominees of the 1970s, 
80s and early 90s used an average of 1.7 abortion frames, Dole, Bush Jr., and McCain 
used an average of 6.7 abortion frames. Similarly, Ford, Reagan and Bush Sr. uttered the 
word “abortion” a total of 11 times during their general election debate appearances, 
whereas Bush Jr. and McCain uttered the word 26 times (The American Presidency 
Project 2009c). 
 As portrayed by the research strategy in Chapter 2, the candidates’ and nominees’ 
abortion related statements have been compared to the “newest” version of the party 
platform in order to try to track changes in their positioning on and framing of abortion 
following the release of new party platforms. My scrutiny of the empirical material has 
not revealed any such clear changes, with one small exception, and this did not come as a 
surprise, since the changes in the party platforms have been detailed and incremental, and 
as the party platforms have been “Pro-Life” all along. However, opposition to partial-
birth abortion was first included in the 1996 party platform, which was released after 
Steve Forbes bowed out of the primaries. He had evaded the abortion issue during the 
1996 primaries, but when he ran again in 2000, he made opposition to partial-birth 
abortion a central issue in his campaign.  
4.9 Pro-Life or Not? That seems to be The Question 
Apparent from this chapter’s review of Republican presidential candidates’ positioning 
on and framing of abortion, “Pro-Choice” or “Wishy-Washy” are not suitable positions 
for Republicans with presidential ambitions. Quoting the famous phrase from 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet: Republican presidential candidates’ “to be or not be”-moment 
rests on their adherence to a “Pro-Life” positioning on and framing of abortion. More 
specifically, this can be viewed as one of the proverbial boxes that must be checked in 
order for the candidate to be able to succeed in the primaries. To be clear, a “Pro-Life” 
positioning on abortion is thus an important aspect of a Republican presidential 
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nominee’s profile, but it is not a guarantee for success, as there are other proverbial boxes 
that need to be checked as well. 
Obviously, it is impossible to unravel the thoughts and convictions of the 
candidates covered in this chapter. Some of them may have seen the light, while others 
may have understood the folly of their former position. Nonetheless, based on the 
empirical material presented in this chapter, such changes of heart have occurred in a 
politically convenient time frame. If nothing else, changing positions were announced at 
strategically favorable moments when viewed against the political calendar.  
Having mapped Republican presidential candidates’ and nominees’ positioning on 
and framing of abortion, the next chapter shifts its focus to Republican presidents – 
namely Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George Bush and George W. Bush. 
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Chapter 5 
Republican presidents on Abortion, 1976-2008 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As Chapter 4 demonstrated, those who won the Republican presidential nomination were 
opposed to abortion and in line with the Republican Party platform during their general 
election campaigns. Thus, the premise underlying this chapter is that the nominees who 
entered the White House did so with a commitment to oppose abortion. The question, 
however, is the degree to which they voiced their opposition. 
Following the structure of the previous chapter, this chapter focuses exclusively 
on Republican presidents’ positioning on and framing of abortion. I start by focusing on 
President Gerald Ford before I turn to President Ronald Reagan, President George Bush 
and President George W. Bush. The chapter ends with a short summary of the presidents’ 
positioning on and framing of abortion. Additional analysis and a discussion of the long-
term trends are dealt with in Chapter 6. 
5.1 President Gerald Ford on abortion 
As I touched upon in the previous chapter, the striking thing about President Gerald 
Ford’s positioning on abortion in 1976 was the fact that he rephrased his position 
following the release of the 1976 party platform. Prior to its release, the Republican Party 
did not have an official position on the issue, and so the dynamic of staying in line with 
the party’s abortion plank was not yet in play. Before the Republican Party announced its 
official stance on abortion, Ford’s position was that Roe v. Wade went too far, but that the 
proposed constitutional amendments to ban abortion were too restrictive: 
 
I think the United States Supreme Court decision went too far. I think in effect it went 
further than it had to. On the other hand, I do not agree with those who would seek to 
amend the Federal Constitution to have an inflexible approach to abortion, either (The 
American Presidency Project 1976c). 
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Following the release of the party platform, Ford stated that he subscribed to the 
Republican Party platform’s position on abortion, but added that he supported an 
amendment that would “turn over to the States the individual right of the voters in those 
States the chance to make a decision by public referendum” (The American Presidency 
Project 1976d) – a position that was at odds with the party platform.  
 President Ford did not address the abortion issue prior to February 1976, and he 
campaigned on a “Wishy-Washy” position in his primary fight against Reagan. His 
position drifted rightwards following the release of the 1976 party platform, but he still 
tried to have it both ways by supporting the party platform’s amendment to ban abortion 
while at the same time supporting individual state action on the issue rather than an effort 
to reach a federal ban against abortion.  
5.2 President Ronald Reagan on abortion 
Ronald Reagan’s opposition to abortion as a presidential candidate was always more 
conservative and outspoken than Gerald Ford’s, and the same can be said about his 
positioning as president. However, Reagan’s rhetoric on the issue was more 
accommodating prior to the 1984 presidential campaign than it was during and following 
his bid for reelection. In 1981, Reagan stated that if it “is once determined” that abortion 
is the taking of a human life “then there isn’t really any need for an amendment” banning 
abortion (The American Presidency Project 1981). In a similar vein, Reagan stated the 
following in 1983: “The Constitution protects life, liberty and so forth. And what all we 
need to do, I think, is demand that someone either prove to us that the unborn is not a 
living being, or then recognize that it is already entitled to constitutional protection” (The 
American Presidency Project 1983). 
 Reagan geared up for his reelection campaign by cutting off foreign aid to clinics 
worldwide who performed, advocated or informed about abortions, and during the 
election, Reagan stated: 
 
I am against abortion because it is the taking of an innocent life. While some argue that 
we cannot pinpoint at which moment life actually begins, I am firmly convinced that we 
must give the unborn child the benefit of the doubt. In my view, the unborn child has a 
right to life, and it is our moral obligation to protect and defend that right (The American 
Presidency Project 1984b). 
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After winning reelection against Walter Mondale, Reagan took a more active role in the 
courting of the pro-life movement. Beginning in 1985, he proclaimed the Sunday prior to 
the anniversary of the U. S. Supreme Court’s passage of Roe v. Wade “National Sanctity 
of Human Life Day”, and he spoke to the participants of the annual March for Life. 
Reagan did this to the end of his presidency, and the precedent was upheld by both of the 
Bushes. 
 When it comes to Reagan’s framing of abortion, he used terms such as “right to 
life”, “unborn child”, and “the dignity of every human being and the sanctity of each 
human life.”  
5.3 President George Bush on abortion 
The pro-life community was always skeptical about George Bush’s pro-life credentials, 
and Bush could not afford to loose the support of this group in the 1988 election. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Bush flipped from pro-choice to pro-life when he 
became Reagan’s vice-presidential nominee in 1980, and he drifted further to the right 
during his time as vice-president and in the time leading up to the 1988 Republican 
primaries. As president, Bush’s positioning on and framing of abortion was in line with 
the Republican Party platform. 
 In 1989, Bush stated that he was firmly in support of an overturn of Roe v. Wade, 
and that he was not “going to change that position” (The American Presidency Project 
1989). In the summer of 1992, gearing up for the general election campaign against Bill 
Clinton, Bush stated that he hoped “the platform committee, in their wisdom, adopts the 
same language as we had before” (The American Presidency Project 1992). On the 
stump, Bush stated that he opposed abortion and that he favored life, and after he lost the 
presidential election, one of his last acts as president was signing the “National Sanctity 
of Human Life Day” proclamation in January 1993 (The American Presidency Project 
1993). 
Throughout his presidency, Bush released all the abortion related statements and 
proclamations that Reagan released during his presidency, and Bush’s framing was 
almost a mirror image of Reagan’s framing. For example, Bush used the following 
abortion frames: “unborn children”, “right to life” and “sanctity of human life.” In the 
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end, although Bush’s positioning was steadily evolving prior to his days in the White 
House, his positioning on and framing of abortion was steadily “Pro-Life” as president. 
5.4 President George W. Bush on abortion 
In the 2000 primaries, George W. Bush pledged his support of the Republican Party 
platform’s anti-abortion plank, although several of his statements during the campaign 
placed him in the “Pro-Life with exceptions” category. As president, however, George 
W. Bush – like his father and President Reagan had been before him – was strictly in line 
with the party platform’s positioning on and framing of abortion. 
 Throughout his presidency, George W. Bush upheld the tradition started by 
Reagan and followed by his father, and proclaimed the Sunday prior to the anniversary of 
the passage of Roe v. Wade as “National Sanctity of Human Life Day”, and addressed the 
participants of the March for Life. Likewise, George W. Bush also reinstated the Mexico 
City Policy introduced by Reagan in 1984, which had been rescinded by Bill Clinton in 
1993. In 2002, Bush laid out his opposition to abortion in his speech to the participants of 
the March for Life: 
 
We believe the promises of the Declaration of Independence are the common code of 
American life. They should apply to everyone, not just the healthy or the strong or the 
powerful. A generous society values all human life. A merciful society seeks to expand 
legal protection to every life, including early life, and a compassionate society will 
defend a simple, moral proposition: Life should never be used as a tool or a means to an 
end. These are bedrock principles, and that is why my administration opposes partial-
birth abortion and public funding for abortion, why we support teen abstinence and crisis 
pregnancy programs, adoption and parental notification laws (The American Presidency 
Project 2002). 
 
Framing wise, Bush’s 2002 speech to the participants of the March for Life reads like a 
rundown of the party platform’s language on abortion. Furthermore, throughout his two 
terms, Bush described himself as “pro-life” and talked about “unborn children”, “right to 
life”, “abstinence education”, “parental notification laws”, “partial-birth abortion” and 
“the sanctity of human life.” In short, Bush was consistently “Pro-Life” and he used more 
abortion frames than any of his Republican predecessors.  
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5.5 The Pro-Life Republican Presidency 
As this short review indicates, Republican presidents act and talk “Pro-Life.” However, 
as a few searches within The American Presidency Project’s archives of official 
presidential documents reveal, the degree in which they emphasize the issue differs: 
President Gerald Ford’s archive includes 13 documents including the word abortion, 
President Ronald Reagan’s includes 77, President George Bush’s 85, while President 
George W. Bush’s archive includes 122 documents. According to this measure, and the 
measurements of saliency presented in Chapter 3, the abortion issue has grown in 
importance between 1976 and 2008. In the end, a quick comparison between President 
Gerald Ford and President George W. Bush’s abortion related public statements 
demonstrates the enormous difference in emphasis given to the abortion issue in the 
middle of the 1970s versus the first decade of the 21st century. 
While the presidents’ emphasis on abortion differs, Table 5.1 shows that they 
have consistently been in the “Pro-Life” category in their positioning on abortion: 
 
Table 5.1 Republican presidents’ positioning on abortion 
 Pro-
Choice 
Wishy-
Washy 
Pro-Life w/ 
exceptions 
Pro-
Life 
Consistent 
positioning 
President Gerald Ford    X X 
President Ronald Reagan    X X 
President George H. W. Bush     X X 
President George W. Bush     X X 
 
While Reagan and the two Bushes were clearly and consistently in the “Pro-Life” 
category, the same is not entirely the case for Ford. Ford’s positioning on abortion could 
perhaps be placed in the “Wishy-Washy” category, but I have nonetheless categorized 
him as “Pro-Life” because of the statement in which he tied himself to the party 
platform’s anti-abortion plank. 
Although the four presidents were consistently “Pro-Life”, their framing of 
abortion differed greatly, and Table 5.2 compares the presidents’ framing with the 
abortion frames used in the Republican Party platforms. 
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Table 5.2 Republican presidents’ framing of abortion 
 President 
Gerald   
Ford 
President 
Ronald 
Reagan 
President 
George 
Bush 
President 
George    
W. Bush 
Totals 
Abortion on demand   X12   X12    X123  X2 4 
Right to life     X123  X1   X12 3 
Unborn (children)     X123    X123   X12 3 
Alternatives to abortion    X23     X123 2 
Sanctity of (innocent) human life     X1*2    X123    X123 3 
Abstinence education       X123 1 
Problem pregnancies   X2   1 
Pro-life (agenda)    X23  X1   X12 3 
Partial-birth abortion       X123 1 
    = Brutal and violent      X12 1 
    = Barbaric     X2 1 
    = 4/5 infanticide     X1**   1 
Crisis pregnancy   X2    X123    X123 3 
Parental notification       X123 1 
Born alive infants      X13 1 
Defense of life     X2 1 
Culture of life       X123 1 
Unplanned pregnancy     X2 1 
Choose life    X23  X1  2 
Totals 1 10 7 16  
Change  +9 -3 +9  
   (+6) (+15)  
Note: 1 = voiced “during” the “1st” party platform period, 2 = “2nd period, 3 = “3rd period.” For example, 
Reagan’s “1st” period was from his first day in office until the release of the 1984 party platform (August 
20, 1984). 
* Sacredness of life.  
** Reagan’s reference to infanticide was about abortion in general.  
The X’s in gray signal the fact that these frames were not in the platform when uttered by the president. 
The following abortion frames were not used by any of the presidents: “Traditional family values”, (partial-
birth abortion equals) “inhuman” and “4/5 infanticide”, “inherent dignity and worth of all people”, and 
“children before birth.” 
 
Intriguingly, Table 5.2 shows a pattern similar to the one found in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in 
Chapter 3: Abortion is emphasized more and more over time. While Table 3.9 showed an 
increasing number of abortion related policy positions, Table 3.10 showed an increasing 
number of abortion frames included in the party platforms over time. Similarly, Table 5.2 
shows that Republican presidents are using more and more abortion frames over time. 
The trend is started by Ronald Reagan, closely followed by George Bush, and brought to 
another level by George W. Bush. The increased number of abortion frames used by the 
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presidents is thus closely linked with the increased emphasis on abortion found in the 
party platforms. As the party platforms focus more and more on abortion, new terms are 
added to describe the party’s positioning, and it should not come as a surprise that 
presidents’ emphasis on the issue evolve in line with the party platforms’ increased 
emphasis on abortion over time. According to this argument, then, the party platform’s 
abortion related language works as a catalyst on the presidents’ framing of abortion. In 
other words, had the 1988 Republican Party Platform been phrased differently, President 
George Bush’s framing of abortion would have been different. Does this mean that 
Republican presidents simply restate whatever the party platforms state on abortion? 
 After a close look on Table 5.2, the answer is “no.” As the X’s marked in gray 
show, several of the abortion frames that eventually made it into the party platform where 
used before they were included in the party platform. Ronald Reagan used five and 
George Bush used three abortion frames before they were included in the party platform, 
and Reagan and the two Bushes all used the abortion frame “abortion on demand” after it 
was dropped from the party platform. This observation points in the direction that the 
relationship between party platforms and presidents can go both ways.  
While Chapter 4 demonstrated that Steve Forbes changed his positioning on and 
framing of abortion following the introduction of the partial-birth abortion issue in the 
1996 party platform, a close scrutiny of the presidents’ empirical material revealed that 
no such clear changes occurred among the presidents after the release of a new party 
platform. There is one large exception, however, as Gerald Ford went from opposing a 
federal ban on abortion to supporting one following the release of the 1976 Republican 
Party Platform. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction  
With the previous chapters as a backdrop, I will now discuss and put the thesis’ major 
findings into context. The approach is descriptive when I deal with the thesis’ findings, 
and explorative and argumentative when I discuss potential explanations of these 
findings. While the perspective of voters’ attitudes and voting patterns has been kept out 
of the analysis so far, I have included voters in the discussion below. It is thus important 
to stress the fact that the thesis’ findings only point to Republican Party platforms’, 
Republican presidential candidates’, nominees’ and presidents’ emphasis and positioning 
on, and framing of abortion – and the relationship between the platform documents and 
the presidential hopefuls and presidents. During the discussion below, however, I discuss 
these findings in a broader perspective, arguing for and against various explanations of 
my findings, and some of these arguments include voters. These arguments are included 
to shed light on the topics covered throughout the thesis, but they serve more as thought 
experiments and ideas for future research rather than arguments serving to “defend” my 
findings. My findings stand their own ground, and this discussion can be viewed as a 
sketch of the surrounding landscape. 
6.2 The increased saliency of abortion within Republican Party platforms 
As Domke and Coe (2008:114) see it, “the Republican strategy since 1980” has been “a 
portrait of consistency and simplicity: the more emphasis on abortion, the better.” As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, four different measurements of saliency showed that 
Republican Party platforms’ emphasis on abortion increased significantly between 1976 
and 2008. Over time, Republican Party platforms have included more and more abortion 
related words, policy positions, and abortion frames. 
 Since party platforms are not read by the average voter, they are in fact 
“opportunities to narrowcast messages to targeted segments of the electorate,” and such 
messages “are the ultimate signaling mechanism for policy goals” (Domke & Coe 
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2008:103). According to such a perspective, the Republican Party platforms’ increased 
focus on abortion rests on an increased willingness to court “engaged groups” looking 
“for distinct ‘planks’ … that discuss their pet concerns” (Domke & Coe 2008:103). 
Narrowcasting can be described as the signal from a dog-whistle, and following this 
analogy, it is important not to blow the whistle too hard – since the dogs might get out of 
hand. In short, you have to court abortion opponents without alienating a troubling 
amount of voters. If one views the abortion related content of Republican Party platforms 
as narrowcasting, then there is no downside to strengthening and elaborating on the 
message, since it is primarily going to be received by “engaged groups” open for such 
messages. 
 Similarly, a plausible explanation of the increased emphasis on abortion is that 
there is no downside in adding emphasis to something that seems to please the section of 
the electorate who is paying attention. Put differently, there is no sense in changing a 
winning formula. The conventional wisdom born with Reagan’s presidency was that the 
Republican Party gained power due in part to Reagan’s success in courting born-again 
evangelicals and the Christian right (Byrnes 1993:506; Carty 2004:164; Domke & Coe 
2008:18; Hudson 2008:25). The anti-abortion plank introduced with Reagan as the 
nominee in 1980 was strengthened in 1984, and it functioned as a key ingredient in the 
Republican Party’s courting of social conservative voters. Tellingly, the abortion plank 
introduced under Reagan has remained intact up until 2008, and it looms like a protected 
set of “abortion commandments” within the party platform. The unwillingness to change 
any of it might be connected with the fact that Republicans view Reagan as the greatest 
president of all time by large margins (Gallup 2009). 
A similar view of the Republican Party’s embrace of the pro-life movement is that 
it is partly based on the belief that the gains connected with increased emphasis on 
abortion are larger than the gains connected with decreased emphasis on abortion. In 
other words, the party platform’s anti-abortion plank is crucial to keep the support of the 
pro-life movement, and the increased emphasis on abortion stems from the wish to please 
abortion opponents. Such a “status-quo plus”-strategy might be defined as playing it safe, 
since it consists of doing more of the same. 
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Now, since Republican Party platforms are more conservative on abortion than a 
majority of the public (General Social Survey 2008), it would seem as if the GOP’s 
strategy on abortion is aimed at courting a specific segment of the electorate. Alternative 
I in Figure 6.1 illustrates a hypothetical distribution of the American electorate in their 
positioning on abortion. According to this distribution, the Democratic and the 
Republican Party would gain from positioning themselves close to the center. However, 
the Republican Party platforms’ anti-abortion plank might be part of a strategy primarily 
aimed at rallying the Republican base – meaning voters who, hypothetically, are 
positioned around position B. 
 
                 
                       Alternative I                                                           Alternative II               
Figure 6.1 Theoretical distributions of voters in a two-party system 
Source: Downs (1957:143). The labels are different in the original, and I have added the shading in Alt. 1. 
 
With this in mind, Alternative I can be viewed as a distribution of the general electorate, 
whereas Alternative II illustrates the partisan divide between Democratic and Republican 
party loyalists. By viewing the space to the right of position B in Alternative I and II as 
the positioning of the Republican primary electorate, then the Republican Party 
platforms’ anti-abortion stance looks like a reasonable positioning from a strategic 
vantage point. Another aspect of this strategic vantage point is alluded to in Alternative I, 
in which the extremes on the continuum are shaded in two different colors. In this 
context, the white area between the shaded areas represents voters who are not paying 
attention to the abortion debate, and the abortion planks of the party platforms can thus be 
viewed as courting one’s own shaded area. Abortion proponents occupy the gray area, 
whereas abortion opponents occupy the black area. The different colors represent the 
tendency of passionate abortion opponents to be more politically active than passionate 
abortion proponents (Strickler & Danigelis 2002:200). In short, this argument portrays 
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the Republican Party platforms’ increased emphasis on abortion as a strategy of courting 
the segments of the electorate who are tuned in and opposed to abortion, and that such a 
strategy can work despite the fact that a majority of the electorate favors abortion rights. 
Viewing the party platform as a tool to achieve such an outcome, it is important to 
dwell on the fact that the platform documents are written and agreed upon by a set of 
committees meeting in the months prior to the Republican National Convention. Pro-life 
groups were lobbying for the inclusion of language opposing abortion already in 1976, 
and they are still active. The pro-life movement is thus continuously lobbying for more 
restrictions on abortion, and is strongly opposed to any loosening of the party platform’s 
anti-abortion stance. Since past lobbying efforts resulted in the inclusion of new language 
in the party platform – such as in 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996 and 2004 – lobby groups 
are encouraged and emboldened to keep pushing for new and strengthened abortion 
provisions. 
Based on such lobbying efforts, the following description is a plausible 
explanation of the relationship between the Republican Party and the pro-life movement: 
As the Republican Party embraced the pro-life movement and increased the emphasis on 
abortion in the party platform, pro-life groups wanted the Republican Party to embrace 
more of their ideas, and made sure the party did not depart from its pro-life position on 
abortion. This dynamic is thus a self-enforcing mechanism, since the GOP’s embrace of 
the pro-life movement is met with open arms, and both sides hold on believing they need 
the other – the GOP because of the pro-life movements’ electoral support, and the pro-life 
movement because the GOP is their best hope to reverse Roe v. Wade. 
The Republican Party’s fundamental stance against abortion has been the same all 
along, but as the abortion debate evolved, new issues emerged, and new abortion related 
policies made it into the party platform. Instead of viewing the increased emphasis on 
abortion as a political ploy to please the pro-life movement, the increased emphasis can 
be a natural effect of the contemporary abortion debate. Since the Republican Party 
opposes abortion, it is bound to restate that position according to the issue of the day. 
According to this argument, a new abortion controversy results in new language, new 
policy positions, and probably also the introduction of new abortion frames. In this 
perspective, the Republican Party’s increased emphasis on abortion over time is a result 
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of the party’s “Pro-Life” position, and the need to restate this position according to the 
contemporary political debate. 
6.3 Drifting rightwards on abortion 
A “big tent” analogy – referring to the tendency of big national parties to embrace a wide 
range of interests in order to attract as many voters as possible – is not suitable to 
describe the Republican Party’s positioning on abortion. In fact, John Anderson – the 
only openly “Pro-Choice” presidential candidate covered by the empirical material – 
decided to run as an Independent after dismal results in the Republican primaries. By 
applying the “big tent” analogy, it seems as if “card carrying” abortion opponents are 
allowed access to the tent much easier than abortion proponents. In order to ease one’s 
access to the Republican tent, conforming one’s position to that of the party line on 
abortion seems to be password. 
The long-term trend of eight presidential candidates growing more opposed to 
abortion, and the prevalence of the consistency-strategy during the primary and the 
general election campaign (see Table 6.2, page 78), both allude to a dynamic based on the 
premise that it is best to drift rightwards on abortion before the presidential campaign 
begins. A rightward drift during an election would receive much more attention from the 
media, and the candidate hopes to avoid close scrutiny by completing one’s move to the 
right on abortion prior to the launch of the campaign. In short, the best time to move 
rightwards on abortion is when you are out of the limelight. However, Chapter 4 
demonstrated that even if candidates drifted rightwards prior to the campaign, this shift 
was nonetheless highlighted by the media and brought into the campaign. It is thus naïve 
to believe that it is possible to shift one’s position on abortion without having to defend 
this shift later on. Nonetheless, it seems better to drift rightwards on abortion prior to, 
rather than in the middle of a campaign.  
As eight36 of the sixteen presidential candidates37 covered in this thesis drifted 
towards a position more in line with the party platform’s staunch opposition to abortion 
                                                
36 Reagan drifted rightwards on abortion prior to 1976, and could not have been influenced by the party 
platform’s stance on abortion, since it was first introduced in the Fall of 1976. 
37 The thesis originally covers nineteen presidential candidates, but the news searches did not retrieve 
enough material on three of the candidates. 
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during the time periods covered by the news searches, it is safe to say that the 
phenomenon is not one of coincidence. When this rightward tilt is viewed together with 
the steadily increasing emphasis on abortion in Republican Party platforms since 1976, 
the following argument emerges: As an issue becomes more important for a political 
party, the incentives for party members to conform their view to the party line grow. As 
the GOP’s opposition to abortion grew in prominence compared to other issues, 
Republicans seeking the highest office of the land had to accept and campaign on the 
platform’s abortion plank. While some candidates sought to include language in the party 
platform accepting the views of abortion proponents, others wanted the platform to 
support abortion in cases of rape and incest. Tellingly, however, none of these efforts 
resulted in any changes, and the same nominees who advocated change, ran on party 
platforms without such changes. 
 However, this last fact might actually allude to the unimportance of the platform 
document. In this perspective, the nominee did not bother putting his own position into 
the platform because he knew it would not matter in the end. On the other hand, it might 
point in the direction that candidates’ and nominees’ talk of such changes were nothing 
more than lip service – and that they never seriously planned to incorporate such changes 
in the party platform. After all, if Dole and McCain – presidential nominees in 1996 and 
2008 respectively – really wanted to include exceptions for rape and incest in the 
abortion plank, they could have done more to obtain such an outcome. 
While this argument perceives that candidates and nominees can actively mould 
the abortion plank to their liking, a different view is that candidates tune their positioning 
on and framing of abortion based on the perceived or expected content of future party 
platforms. This argument, hinting at “anticipatory effects”, casts the party platforms more 
as “off limits”, and projects that since they have been consistently “Pro-Life” since 1976, 
they will probably continue to be so in the future, and candidates would thus gain from a 
“Pro-Life” positioning on abortion. Similarly, candidates who do not conform their views 
on the issue prior to a presidential bid might do so the second time around based on the 
perception of how their abortion stance played out for them the first time. According to 
these arguments, Republican presidential candidates’ positioning on abortion is heavily 
influenced by the abortion related content of the Republican Party platform.  
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 It is impossible to accurately decipher why eight of the Republican presidential 
candidates covered in this thesis drifted rightwards on abortion. I am not a psychic, but it 
is possible to draw upon the candidate-narratives presented in Chapter 4 and the empirical 
material on which they are constructed. First of all, words matter, and as a result of the 
textual data retrieved from the extensive news searches, it is possible to compare the 
candidates’ statements with the political calendar. What did the candidate say when he 
was not running for president, what did he say just prior to announcing his candidacy, and 
what did he say during the Iowa caucuses? In addition to an observation of, say – 
“candidate X started to drift rightwards on abortion one year before he announced his 
candidacy, and campaigned on an anti-abortion message during the primaries” – one can 
look at the words used by the candidate to defend his shift. However, if the candidate 
does not describe why he changed his position, this is also a clue of the forces at play. 
One would think that a candidate who suddenly shifts his position without informing the 
electorate is not particularly interested in revealing the fact that he previously supported a 
different position. 
 What we are left with, then, is the fact that eight Republican presidential 
candidates grew more opposed to abortion in a politically convenient time frame. 
Although I have put the candidate-narratives into context by discussing a range of 
possible explanations for the candidates’ rightward drift on abortion, such an analysis 
cannot produce a definite conclusion on why candidate X acts the way he does. Similar to 
Domke and Coe (2008:19), I am “agnostic about the authenticity of politicians’ religious 
beliefs” since “it is impossible to know whether a politician truly shares or cares about 
the religious sentiments of the citizenry.” Furthermore, my approach throughout the 
thesis can be summarized by the following quote: “Are these religious signals authentic? 
Perhaps. Are they strategic? Absolutely” (Domke & Coe 2008:19). Thus, even if it is 
impossible to unravel candidates’ inner thoughts and ideas on abortion, the words they 
use and the strategies they choose matter.  
6.3.1 Framing abortion 
Table 3.10 in Chapter 3 listed the abortion frames used in the various versions of the 
party platforms and demonstrated that more and more of them were added over time. 
Based on this information, Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 and Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 compared 
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the presidential candidates’ and the presidents’ framing of abortion to the party 
platforms’ framing of abortion. While Table 4.2 showed the varying degree to which 
candidates applied the platforms’ abortion language, Table 5.2 showed that the 
presidents’ framing of abortion have evolved according to the number of abortion frames 
found within the party platforms. I will deal with the presidential candidates first. 
 According to the information in Table 4.2, it is clear that the candidates 
emphasize the issue differently, and that the most commonly used abortion frames are the 
ones who perhaps best describe the Republican Party’s position on abortion: “pro-life” – 
tying the party to the term abortion opponents prefer to describe themselves with, and 
“right to life” and “unborn” – focusing on the unjust practice of abortion and framing the 
fetus as a human being yet to be born, thus framing abortion as the taking of a human life. 
 Among the abortion frames, the term “pro-life” is the one most frequently used by 
both the presidential candidates and the media. Furthermore, the term “pro-life” is 
understood by the average American to mean “abortion opponent”. Based on this 
dynamic, then, it is possible for candidates, regardless of their previous positioning, to 
describe themselves as simply “pro-life”, and thus send the message that they are in line 
with the Republican Party platform on abortion – which is commonly just referred to as 
“pro-life on abortion.” Thus, in addition to presenting one’s position in the most 
favorable light, the power of framing is to send signals about one’s position to people 
who are not necessarily aware of previous statements on the issue. In the words of 
Domke and Coe (2008:6), one of the most important lessons “in contemporary American 
politics” is that “to compete successfully, politicians need not always walk the religious 
walk, but they … better be able to talk the religious talk.”  
According to this argument, framing can be applied as “lip service” – by telling a 
group what they want to hear. If that means opposing abortion – so be it. On the one 
hand, the belief in such tactics reek of cynicism and contempt for politicians, but on the 
other hand, if a candidate is on record saying one thing, and then suddenly frames his 
position with a term that completely contradicts his previously stated position, is not that 
evidence of lip service? In similar terms, such an act is pandering at best, and downright 
lying at worst. If lying is defined as stating something that is not factually true, then lip 
service, in this context, can be defined as describing one’s position through a set of 
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abortion frames which convey an image of one’s position that is not factually accurate. In 
this light, framing can be used to conceal one’s position by putting makeup on it. 
However, contrary to the famous saying – “you can put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a 
pig” – a successful framing strategy omits the second part, and the lipstick completely 
conceals, or muddles, one’s actual position.38 
A different version of this argument is that Republican presidential candidates’ 
and nominees’ use of abortion frames is a way of telling the voters what they are used to 
hear. Viewed together with the party platforms’ anti-abortion plank and its pro-life-
movement-approved-vernacular, candidates’ anti-abortion positioning and framing can be 
viewed as a straitjacket of sorts. The candidate is allowed a limited amount of wiggle 
room in his treatment of the abortion issue, but he cannot go rogue without facing the 
consequences. According to this perspective, the party platforms’ anti-abortion plank is a 
powerful primer of candidates’ and nominees’ treatment of the issue.  
When it comes to the presidents’ framing of abortion, Table 5.2 demonstrated that 
the presidents’ use of abortion frames increased in a similar fashion to the number of 
abortion frames found within the party platforms over time. Now, as I mentioned towards 
the end of Chapter 5, it can be argued that the party platforms’ abortion related language 
works as a catalyst on the presidents’ framing of abortion. This argument thus closely 
resembles the wiggle-room-available-inside-the-straitjacket-argument, and suggests that 
presidents’ framing of abortion is tightly connected with that of the party platform. 
However, since the president campaigns on the basis of this platform – contrary to 
Ware’s (2006:272) generalization of party platforms – it should not come as a surprise 
that the president utters its abortion related language during the campaign, and during his 
time in office.  
According to this argument, one could infer that Republican presidents simply 
restate whatever the party platforms state on abortion. This is not entirely the case, 
however, since the overview of the presidents’ framing of abortion in Table 5.2 shows 
that certain abortion frames are left out of the presidents’ abortion related language. With 
                                                
38 The saying sparked a “controversy” in the 2008 presidential campaign, and I am aware of the fact that 
those events might color the perception of the analogy. However, it is an old saying, and it functions as a 
nice analogy of the dynamic I am describing. 
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this as a backdrop, a slightly different version of this argument is that the presidents’ 
framing of abortion takes place within the bounds of the party platforms’ abortion plank, 
but that it is up to the president himself to choose which abortion frames to use. 
 Comparing the abortion frames used by the presidential candidates and the 
presidents, it is safe to say that the presidents’ framing bear closer resemblance to the 
party platform’s framing of abortion. Since Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 shows that Ford, 
Reagan and George Bush used few abortion frames as presidential candidates, their 
framing of abortion as presidents is not caused by their past framing of abortion. 
Something else is at play here, and the party platforms loom large.  
However, the shaded areas of Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 showed that six of the ten 
abortion frames used by President Ronald Reagan, and four of the seven abortion frames 
used by President George Bush were not included in the party platform when the 
president uttered them. These abortion frames were included in the party platform by the 
time George W. Bush became president, which would point in the direction that words 
and phrases used by presidents can be included in the party platform over time. While the 
presence of this pattern demonstrates that the president can frame abortion by words and 
phrases that are not included in the party platform, and that this framing can make it into 
the platform over time, it should be stressed that George W. Bush stuck to the platforms’ 
abortion frames.  
While the examples mentioned above deal with abortion frames uttered before 
they were included in the party platform, the “abortion on demand” frame was only 
included in the 1976 party platform, but has been used by all of the presidents. 
Considering the precedents set by Reagan’s proclamations and statements, this could 
mean that the presidents’ framing of abortion is not only based on the content of the party 
platform, but also on the content of past presidents’ statements on the issue.  
6.3.2 The strategy of framing  
The essentials of the Republican Party platforms’ framing of abortion can be described by 
three main points. First of all, the framing is based on the basic premise that the fetus is a 
human being yet to be born. By using phrases such as “unborn children” and “children 
before birth”, the Republican position on abortion is in “defense of life,” and aimed at 
convincing people to “choose life.” Secondly, life is sacred. By framing life as sacred by 
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a term such as “the sanctity of human life”, and linking the support of life to “traditional 
family values,” the platform’s language draws on morality and religious sentiments, and 
casts the support of abortion as something unsacred and immoral. Building on the first 
and second point, the last piece in the framing puzzle holds that abortion equals the 
killing of a human being.  
 In the end, the framing found within the Republican Party platforms are aimed at 
casting abortion procedures and abortion proponents in the worst possible light. 
Obviously, abortion proponents are guilty of the same in their framing of abortion 
opponents. Based on this reality, political framing is a continuous battle over the voters’ 
vocabulary. Thus, political framing precludes what the Nineteenth Century Norwegian 
author Aasmund Olavsson Vinje called “tvisyn”. Although there does not exist a suitable 
English equivalent to this term, “tvisyn” is based on the notion that it is possible to see 
both the negative and the positive sides of an issue at the same time. By framing one’s 
position on abortion as “pro-life,” however, the focus is exclusively on the evil of 
terminating a pregnancy, and not on the mother’s well being. Furthermore, it casts those 
in favor of abortion as anti-life, and ignores perspectives of women’s health all together – 
both physically and psychologically. Thus, political framing casts the opposition in a 
negative light, and one’s own positions in a positive light, and as a consequence, political 
framing precludes “tvisyn” – since it ignores negative aspects or consequences of one’s 
own position.   
 By using the Republican Party platforms’ abortion related language, candidates, 
nominees and presidents willfully simplify the issue by framing it to further their own 
cause. Of course, language is never neutral, but it is still possible to describe one’s 
position without ignoring the negative consequences of this position, although this might 
not always be the best strategy in politics. While people who cannot see the whole picture 
fail to “see the forest for the trees,” a pro-life framing of abortion describes a forest while 
ignoring the trees. In this analogy, the forest represents the immorality of abortion, and 
the trees symbolize the women who would be affected if Roe v. Wade were overturned.39  
                                                
39 This analogy can also describe a pro-choice framing of abortion, in which the forest represents women’s 
right to choose, and the trees symbolize the fate of the fetuses/the “unborn.” Either way, political framing 
ignores that which is of less concern to one’s position, and focuses on the “greater good”, so to speak. 
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In this way, the framing is truly abstract since it focuses on “family values” and “the 
sanctity of life” instead of the personal stories of individual women.  
According to such a view, one might think it is easy for middle-aged men to rally 
against the evils of abortion since the reality of the procedure – including the 
circumstances surrounding the decision, and the consequences of the outcome – is 
abstract. Building on this perspective, politicians can easily oppose abortion because of 
the abstract nature of the issue. One would thus think that candidates would not be so 
clear-cut in their answers if the issue were not so abstract – having to deal, for example, 
with abortion related questions regarding one’s own wife or daughter. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 4, McCain initially gave a “Pro-Choice” answer when he was asked about the 
prospects of his daughter having an abortion, before he backpedaled. It might be easy to 
oppose abortion when tough decisions are kept at a safe distance, but much harder to do 
when one’s family is brought into the picture. 
In the grand scheme of things, political framing is a tool to win a fight, and on a 
contentious and emotional issue such as abortion, people with strong convictions seek to 
have one’s own definition of reality dominating “discourse and decision-making” (Ball-
Rokeach et al. 1990:254). According to Woliver (1996:6-7), “abortion politics” is “so 
evocative of emotions and symbols” that “the language used to frame the debate has 
heavy implications for policymaking,” and that the applied definition “shapes the rest of 
the policy debate, and very likely the outcome as well.” In the end, framing matters, and 
abortion opponents and proponents will never find any common ground, unless they 
change the tone of their language.  
6.4 The strategy of one’s positioning on abortion 
As the presentation of the nineteen Republican presidential candidates’ positioning on 
abortion in Chapter 4 demonstrated, some candidates were consistent in their positioning 
on abortion, whereas others drifted rightwards or wobbled between various positions. 
Based on this observation, I have created a four-category classification schema of 
Republican presidential candidates’ and nominees’ strategy on abortion. 
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Table 6.1 Republican presidential candidates’ and nominees’ strategy on abortion: 
A four-category classification schema. 
Strategy Description 
CONSISTENCY A consistent message (though not necessarily “Pro-Life”). 
 
DRIFTING Conform your views, step by step, towards the Republican Party 
Platform’s abortion plank (based on the current version and/or the 
expected content of the forthcoming platform). 
 
WOBBLING Wobble left and right by deliberately sending mixed messages so 
that abortion proponents think you are not really part of the pro-
life movement, while abortion opponents still believe you are 
really on their side of the fence.  
 
EVADING Downplay or ignore the abortion issue, and avoid stating one’s 
position in clear-cut terms. 
 
Out of the four strategies, the consistency-strategy is the most common one during the 
primaries, whereas the drifting-strategy is more common in the period prior to and in the 
period between primaries. The wobbling-strategy can be applied both prior to and during 
the primaries, whereas the evading-strategy is less usual, and unsuitable in the long haul, 
since the abortion issue is “a difficult issue for candidates to fudge,” and an issue “on 
which the major political parties take distinct and clearly defined positions” (Koch 
2001:5). 
 The consistency-strategy rests on the basic premise that a candidate is best served 
by repeating his position over and over again without any sort of drifting, wobbling or 
evading. In short, repeat your message endlessly, and hope the voters get the message. 
This strategy is particularly evident in the candidates’ stump speeches on the campaign 
trail, and it is traceable by looking at the issues raised and the framing used to describe 
one’s positioning. 
The drifting-strategy is not as easy to dissect as the consistency-strategy. 
Candidates can drift rightwards openly, by admitting they have changed their view on 
abortion, or they can drift rightwards covertly, by trying to slip unnoticed into the “pro-
life tent”, so to speak. Furthermore, some candidates might have experienced a personal 
change of heart, whereas others are acting on political calculations. Thus, candidates can 
have different motives behind their drift in the direction of the party platform’s abortion 
plank, but such motives are beyond our grasp. In short, then, the drifting-strategy consists 
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of aligning oneself closer with the party platform’s anti-abortion plank. The motives 
behind moving rightwards on abortion are beside the point – it is the rightward drift that 
matters. 
According to the wobbling-strategy, it is favorably politically to be “off message” 
– contradicting the contemporary campaign logic of staying “on message” (Norris et al. 
1999). More precisely, the wobbling-strategy consists of being on message to various 
groups, which gives bystanders catching both messages the perception that they are off 
message. Thus, the purpose of the wobbling-strategy is to have one’s pie and eat it too, 
and the goal is to attract proponents of abortion, without pushing away abortion 
opponents. This act of political theater is based on the premise that although you might 
court pro-choicers one day and pro-lifers the next day, both sides believe you are really 
on their side. Furthermore, with a smart media strategy, the candidate can court pro-
choice voters on a well-publicized television show, and backpedal and excuse oneself to 
the pro-life community through campaign officials and less publicized statements. You 
court both sides, but through different channels. The wobbling-strategy thus resembles 
what Domke and Coe (2008:130) describe as “The God Strategy,” requiring politicians to 
walk “a fine line” by sending signals “to devout religious believers that they share and 
appreciate” their faith, “without pushing away religious moderates or secular-minded 
voters.” According to Domke and Coe (2008:130), this strategy builds on “the golden 
rule of today’s U.S. politics: exhibit faith, but don’t be too strident or nakedly partisan in 
doing so.” 
The evading-strategy consists of ducking questions about abortion and attempting 
to keep abortion out of one’s campaign. Arguably, this can be done in a consistent 
manner, which would include it as a part of the consistency-strategy, but the two 
strategies differ on the grounds that whereas the evading-strategy seeks to avoid talking 
about abortion, the consistency-strategy seeks to drive home a specific abortion related 
message. Although several different motives might favor the use of the evading-strategy, 
the key ingredient is the absence of an abortion message, and if pressed, an unwillingness 
to lean to either side of the issue. 
 Below, I have categorized the presidential candidates and nominees based on the 
strategy they applied in the various primaries and general elections. 
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Table 6.2 Republican presidential candidates’ and nominees’ strategy on abortion 
Strategy Election-cycle 
CONSISTENCY Reagan 76/80/84, Anderson 80*, Bush 88/92, Dole 88, Kemp 88, 
Robertson 88, Buchanan 92/96, Keyes 96/00, McCain 00, Forbes 
00, Bush 04, Huckabee 08, Romney 08, Thompson 08 
 
DRIFTING Ford 76, Bush 80 
 
WOBBLING Dole 96, Alexander 96, Bush 00, McCain 08 
 
EVADING Forbes 96  
Note: *Anderson ran as a Republican until he launched his bid as an Independent on April 24, 1980. Crane, 
Baker and Paul are not included in the table due to the limited amount of news articles retrieved from the 
news searches. The various candidates and nominees are grouped into the four categories based on the 
narratives presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Whereas Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 grouped the candidates based on whether or not their 
positioning was consistent when considering the entire time period covered by the news 
searches, Table 6.2 groups the candidates and nominees according to the strategy they 
used in the various presidential elections they participated in. Thus, there is no 
contradiction in the fact that a candidate categorized as “grew more conservative” in 
Table 4.1, can be categorized as adhering to the consistency-strategy in Table 6.2. For 
example, Ronald Reagan drifted rightwards on abortion between 1966 and 1976, but his 
strategy was consistently anti-abortion in 1976, 1980, and 1984. Similarly, Steve Forbes 
is categorized as “grew more conservative” in Table 4.1, but he applied the evading-
strategy in 1996 and the consistency-strategy in 2000. Consequently, whereas Chapter 4 
showed that eight out of sixteen candidates grew more conservative on abortion between 
1976 and 2008 – pointing in the direction of the drifting-strategy’s importance – only two 
candidates actually drifted rightwards during a presidential campaign. As Table 6.2 
shows, the consistency-strategy is by far the most usual one during presidential 
campaigns, followed by the wobbling-strategy, the drifting-strategy, and the evading-
strategy. 
 A close look at Table 6.2 reveals the fact that, with the exception of Gerald Ford, 
Republican presidential nominees have applied two main abortion strategies. Whereas 
Ronald Reagan and George Bush applied the consistency-strategy in their first (and 
second) campaign as the nominee, the three last presidential nominees have all utilized 
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the wobbling-strategy in their first campaigns as the nominee: Bob Dole in 1996, George 
W. Bush in 2000, and John McCain in 2008. In other words, the consistency-strategy can 
be viewed as the “old” way to the Republican nomination and the White House, whereas 
the “new” way seems to depend on the wobbling-strategy. However, George W. Bush’s 
first presidential campaign was the only instance in which a candidate applying the 
wobbling-strategy actually won the general election, which points in the direction that the 
consistency-strategy is actually the most effective strategy when it comes to winning the 
general election. 
6.5 What does it all mean? 
Since 1976, Republican Party platforms have focused more and more on abortion. 
Furthermore, in the same time period, half of the presidential candidates covered in this 
thesis drifted rightwards on abortion.40 While the saliency of the abortion issue within 
Republican Party platforms increased, the incentives to conform to the party line on 
abortion grew. Apparently, then, pro-choice Republicans with presidential ambitions 
need to drift rightwards on abortion and come up with a convincing narrative of why they 
have changed their positioning. If they decide to hold on to their pro-choice views, they 
need to apply the evading-strategy for all that it is worth. Steve Forbes did this in 1996, 
but as I showed in Chapter 4, he drifted rightwards between 1996 and 2000, and applied 
the consistency-strategy in 2000 – touting his opposition to abortion by labeling George 
W. Bush a “pro-life pacifist.”  
 As already mentioned, the precedents set by the party platforms of the 1980s were 
increasingly viewed as important cornerstones of the Republican Party platform – and 
Domke and Coe (2008:114) have described this development as a strategy resting on the 
following premise: “the more emphasis on abortion, the better.” As a result, the 
possibility of changing or including more accommodating language in the abortion plank 
dissipated. Consequently, such changes will only be included in the party platform if the 
Republican coalition drifts considerably to the left, or if the abortion issue’s political 
                                                
40 Reagan drifted rightwards prior to 1976, and the news searches did not retrieve a sufficient amount of 
news articles dealing with Baker, Crane and Paul. 
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importance decreases significantly. Based on the data covered by this thesis, such a 
development seems highly unlikely, to say the least. 
 However, a close look at the abortion related content of the 2008 Republican 
Party Platform might allude to a new trend in the platforms’ treatment of abortion. While 
the abortion words percentages (Tables 3.1 and 3.2) clearly show that the 2008 
platform’s emphasis on abortion is higher than in any of the other party platforms, the 
number of abortion related policy positions and abortion frames is lower than within the 
2004 party platform. In fact, the 2008 party platform represents the first instance in which 
policy positions were dropped without the introduction of new ones. In addition to 
leaving out two policy positions, the 2008 platform left out seven abortion frames that 
had been included in the 2004 platform.41 It remains to be seen whether or not the 2008 
party platform represents a new development, and the abortion related content of the 
2012 party platform will provide a good indication of whether or not this is the case. 
 Considering the large size of the country, the diversity of views and beliefs among 
voters, and the heavily contested primaries – a presidential candidate has to jump through 
a lot of hoops to even be a serious contender for the presidency. Furthermore, candidates 
and nominees in either party have to earn the support of different business sectors, 
industries, unions and so forth, and in order to do so, candidates have to cast a wide net. 
However, some voting blocs are more crucial than others – such as abortion opponents to 
the GOP – and so while candidates might have different goals and intentions, the 
strategies they choose follow predictable paths in some areas. In short, a presidential 
candidate has to check a large number of proverbial boxes, do a lot of campaigning, and 
please a lot of people to become president. Cillizza has stated that “everything that 
happens in politics has to do with campaigns,” and especially so in “even-numbered” 
years “freighted with politics” (CNN 2010). In this perspective, presidential candidates 
have to do a lot of things they might not otherwise have done, just to get to the position to 
actually govern. Campaigning can thus be seen as something that has to be done to 
                                                
41  Policy 14 and 17 were dropped (see Table 3.9). The following abortion frames were left out: “problem 
pregnancies”, “pro-life agenda”, (partial-birth abortion is) “brutal and violent” and “inhumane”, “crisis 
pregnancy”, “defense of life”, and “culture of life” (See Table 3.10). 
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achieve what you actually want. Cynically, such an argument almost takes it for granted 
that candidates and nominees pander during the campaign. 
 However, it is important to stress the fact that what looks like pandering might not 
be pandering at all, and it is hard to know for sure. Still, by focusing on the realities of a 
campaign and the road to victory, and keeping in mind the carefully crafted image of the 
candidates that reach the average voter, it might be useful to ponder what it is that voters 
expect of politicians. What is the ideal? And what is acceptable? Is the ideal to speak 
one’s mind and stick to his or her principles? And is it acceptable to leave such ideals 
behind just as long as you say the right thing, even if you do not actually mean it? 
 The candidates’ and nominees’ apparent “conforming” to the party platforms’ 
positioning on and framing of abortion allude to the importance of the party platforms. If 
party platforms do not mean anything, then it would not matter what they say about 
abortion. However, the difference in how one perceives the importance of party platforms 
might rest on the group one considers, since the party platform means different things to 
different people. While it might be true that party platforms are not important to the 
electorate at large, they are important for abortion opponents, Republican presidential 
hopefuls, and presidents. Republican Party platforms are thus the complete opposite of 
“worthless pieces of paper.” Whether or not presidential candidates abide by the abortion 
plank of the Republican Party platform is in fact a litmus test of immense importance, 
and is thus a bellwether42 of one’s chances in the Republican primaries. Crucially, the 
content of Republican Party platforms are important to those who matter.  
 Presidential candidates – the very definition of political animals – reflect the 
nature of politics, and in order to bring change, they have to be a part of the system, or 
align themselves with people who are. It might not be politically expedient to “speak 
one’s mind” when dealing with a contentious issue such as abortion while balancing a 
partisan divide in the midst of a presidential campaign. At least if your position differs 
from the one laid out in the platform document belonging to the party you are trying to 
represent in the White House. Suffice to say, party platforms matter, and Republican 
presidential candidates, nominees, and presidents know this – and act accordingly. 
                                                
42 A bellwether is the leading sheep of a flock, and it bears a bell hung round its neck. In political terms, the 
word “bellwether” is used to symbolize an early indicator of future trends and developments. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This thesis has dealt with the abortion related content of Republican Party platforms, and 
the relationship between the platforms’ abortion plank and Republican presidential 
candidates’, nominees’ and presidents’ positioning on and framing of abortion. Based on 
four different measurements of saliency – abortion words percentages, the number of 
times the word “abortion” was mentioned, the number of abortion related policy 
positions, and the number of abortion frames – the analysis demonstrated that the 
emphasis on abortion has increased significantly within Republican Party platforms in the 
period between 1976 and 2008. In line with the narrative of an increased emphasis on 
abortion, the number of abortion frames used by the presidents and the number of 
separate occasions in which the presidents addressed the abortion issue both increased 
over time. The increasing saliency of the abortion issue within Republican Party 
platforms can thus be described as a piling-on tendency driven by the following premise: 
“the more emphasis on abortion, the better” (Domke & Coe 2008:114). 
Furthermore, the analysis of the retrieved news articles demonstrated that eight of 
the sixteen presidential candidates on which the news searches retrieved a sufficient 
amount of data, grew more conservative on abortion upon running for the Republican 
presidential nomination. The analysis also revealed that eight candidates upheld a 
consistent positioning on abortion, and that no one grew more supportive of abortion 
rights. While the analysis of the party platforms demonstrated the increased emphasis on 
abortion, the candidate-narratives revealed that opposition to abortion remains the 
prevalent position among Republican presidential candidates and nominees.  
The three first words of the title of this thesis is “litmus test conformity.” This 
term refers to the fact that only candidates who opposed abortion obtained the Republican 
presidential nomination, and that the four Republican presidents all adhered to the party 
platform’s anti-abortion plank. Furthermore, the fact that eight presidential candidates 
drifted in the direction of the party platforms’ stance on abortion upon running for the 
presidency alludes to the power of conformity. Aware of the party line on abortion, and 
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the nominee’s responsibility to abide by the party line, Republicans with presidential 
ambitions know that they have to be closely aligned with the party platforms’ anti-
abortion plank if they are serious about obtaining the nomination. Litmus test conformity 
is thus self-enforced, as events of the past lead potential Republican presidential 
candidates onto the “Pro-Life” path – knowing that every Republican presidential 
nominee and president has treaded it since 1976. Quoting the famous phrase from 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet: Republican presidential candidates’ “to be or not to be”-moment 
rests on their adherence to a “Pro-Life” positioning on and framing of abortion. Pro-Life 
or not? That seems to be the question, since those who are not face a much tougher path 
to the nomination – a path that has not been treaded before. 
In short, the thesis has demonstrated the increased emphasis on the abortion issue 
within Republican Party platforms, and the (increased) importance of presidential 
candidates’ and nominees’ adherence to the party platform’s anti-abortion plank. Thus, a 
relationship clearly exists between the abortion related content of Republican Party 
platforms and Republican presidential candidates’, nominees’, and presidents’ 
positioning on and framing of abortion. Against this backdrop, the party platform is an 
important guide for Republican presidential candidates, nominees, and presidents when it 
comes to their positioning on and framing of abortion. The party platform matters to 
Republicans with presidential ambitions. 
 Future research could extend the project at hand to focus on the Democratic side 
of the aisle. Furthermore, the thesis’ research strategy could be replicated to focus on the 
relationship between party platforms and presidential candidates in future presidential 
campaigns. In addition, the information on the Republican Party platform’s abortion 
plank can be applied to assess the prospects of Republican presidential hopefuls, and such 
an analysis could also apply the four-category classification schema in the analysis of 
their positioning on abortion. The tools applied in the analysis of the past can thus be 
applied in the analysis of events still to come. 
While this thesis has focused on abortion, the research strategy can just as easily 
be applied to any issue within any party platform, in any country. The research strategy is 
suitable to comparisons of party platforms over time, and in comparisons between the 
content of party platforms and the public statements of politicians. Furthermore, it can 
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reveal the emphasis on a specific issue over time, and compare different parties’ 
emphasis on various issues to one another. 
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Postlude 
 
Having initially stated his intention to keep religion out of his presidential campaign, The 
West Wing’s Republican presidential nominee Arnold Vinick eventually drifted onto a 
more common path trodden by Republican presidential candidates and nominees, and 
courted the social conservative base of his party.  
 The first step taken in this direction was when Vinick promised a pro-life activist 
in a closed meeting that he would nominate pro-life judges. Later that same day, 
however, Vinick appeared on television pledging he would do no such thing. The pro-life 
activist then leaked the story about Vinick’s promise, and Vinick’s pro-life vice-
presidential nominee had to deal with the issue. In Vinick’s own words: “I was just trying 
to get through the meeting. He had me cornered. So I figured, what the hell – tell him 
what he wants to hear, and then ignore him when I’m in the White House” (NBC 
2005b).43 Later in the campaign, a pro-life group launched a TV-ad against Vinick’s 
Democratic opponent: 
 
This November, America faces a vote of conscience. Matt Santos on Human life: “Do I 
wanna limit access to abortion? No.” No on telling you when your daughter wants an 
abortion. No on banning partial-birth abortions. Is that a vote you want on your 
conscience? Paid for by the Committee for the Integrity of Human Life. 
 
Vinick’s response: “Who the hell is the Committee for the Integrity of Human Life? And 
who told them to drag abortion into my campaign?” (NBC 2005c).44 
Even though Vinick had so eloquently stated that religion should be kept out of 
politics at the outset of the general election, the forces at play was out of his hands, and 
the abortion issue was central to his campaign even without his consent. Pro-choice 
groups eventually picked up on Vinick’s unwillingness to side with the pro-life 
movement, and approached his campaign about the prospects of an endorsement. 
However, Vinick did not want their support – fearing the political fallout among 
                                                
43 Season 7, Episode 3. Timestamp: [32:30-32:38]. 
44 Season 7, Episode 6. Timestamp: [04:34-05:03].  
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Republican voters – and instead told his campaign strategist that he needed “speech 
language on partial-birth abortion” that would “mollify the right” (NBC 2005c).45  
The Vinick analogy is a fictional tale of the forces at play in the politics of 
abortion during presidential elections. It does not, however, provide any new answers on 
what drives Republicans with presidential ambitions in the direction of a “Pro-Life” 
positioning on abortion. Even if the next presidential election does not provide any new 
clues on the matter, it will nonetheless demonstrate, once more, that Jefferson’s ideal of a 
“wall of separation” between church and state is in fact a notion far away from the 
intertwined nature of politics and religion in contemporary American politics. So much 
so, in fact, that Jefferson’s ideal of a “wall of separation” looks more like “a bridge of 
integration” (Domke & Coe 2008:139). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
45 Season 7, Episode 6. Timestamp: [26:50-28:13].  
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Appendix 
 
I conducted the news searches within LexisNexis, which is a subscription based 
electronic search engine. Since the University of Oslo did not subscribe to LexisNexis, I 
applied for a one-month free trial period through LexisNexis Netherlands. Once I gained 
access and ran the news searches, it became apparent that I would have to go elsewhere to 
gather news articles for the time periods that were not covered by LexisNexis. Google 
News’ Advanced News Archive Search46 became the solution, and I used the same search 
criteria and purchased article packs individually from The New York Times and Chicago 
Tribune (the retrieved articles from Time Magazine and Newsweek were free). In addition 
to the search criteria mentioned in Chapter 2, I excluded articles categorized as “op-eds” 
or “commentary”, since such articles might have been written with a certain bias. 
 
Example of one the articles retrieved from LexisNexis: 
 
                                                
46 You can find the search engine here: http://news.google.com/archivesearch/advanced_search 
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Example of one of the articles purchased from the Chicago Tribune: 
 
 
 
The CD accompanying this thesis includes a more extensive appendix.47 
                                                
47 It is also available upon request from the author: are_flaten@hotmail.com 
